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ABSTRACI' 
The Defence of the Realm Acts (DORA) 
and the Expansion of the British State, 1914-1921. 
Mark Brian Klobas, B. A, , University of Arizona 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. R. J. Q. Adams 
The First World War brought about an unprecedented expansion in the 
power and scope of the British state. While there were a number of laws 
involved in this expansion, none were as important or as far reaching as the 
Defense of the Realm Acts (DORA). This was a series of laws passed by 
Parliament that granted the government the ability to govern through 
administrative decree (in the form of regulations created by the Cabinet and its 
departments) instead of through the lawmaking process. The Acts established a 
form of constitutional dictatorship throughout Britain, with virtually no checks 
to these new powers. The British populace accepted these powers as necessary 
to win the War, and tolerated many measures that they would have strenuously 
opposed in peacetime. 
These powers were granted in a number of areas, The cornerstone of 
DORA's power was in property requisitioning, allowing for permanent seizure 
of property for a nominal amount of compensation. While challenged in a 
number of cases that produced landruark decisions for British constitutional 
history, the overwhelming majority of people accepted the state's initial offer or 
the result of the arbitration made by the Defence of the Realm Losses 
Commission (DRLC). Property requisitioning often served only as a tool for 
larger policy goals, however, and was applied in both the agricultural and 
industrial sectors of the economy to facilitate a continual supply of goods to 
factories and the battlefront. Regulations were also used as social regulation 
and to restrict civil liberties such as the freedom of the press in order to ensure 
the successful prosecution of the war with maximum efficiency. 
The most important role that the Acts played, however, was in its legacy, 
People became accustomed to the intrusive role of the state, especially given the 
government's judicious handling of DORA's powers. After the war the Acts 
often served as a model for postwar legislation that granted the government 
extraordinary powers to deal with problems. In this sense, DORA shaped 
British history, carving out a far greater role for government than had previously 
existed in Britain, 
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ANTECENDENTS AND ORIGINS 
To most Americans, the historical source of constitutional rights is Great 
Britain. It is here where such concepts as government by the people, trial by a 
jury of one's peers, and the freedoms of speech, property, and the press were 
formulated in their modern context. It was here, wrote the great English legal 
expert Albert Vena Dicey, that government was conducted with "the absence of 
arbitrary power on tbe part of the Crown, of the executive, and of every other 
authority in England. " Nor were these rights the result of benevolent evolution. 
Throughout British histoty, monarchs have been overthrown, wars waged, and 
blood spilled over tbe struggle for these rights which Dicey and others revered. 
Yet the onset of World War I caused a fundamental transformation in 
tbe British constitution and in the powers of the state. The rights which bad 
been so 6ercely defended over the centuries were casually put aside, as the state 
was endowed with far-ranging powers, in effect creating what some termed a 
"constitutional dictatorship. " Though these powers were conferred through a 
number of statutes, the single greatest source was what came universally to be 
called DORA, the innocuous-sounding acronym for tbe Defence of the Realm 
This thesis follows the style and format of Twentieth Century Brilish 
Acts. ' Through DORA, the state extended its control seemingly over every 
facet of life, and this power was recognized both by contemporaries and 
subsequent observers of the period. Yet despite DORA's importance, much of 
the Act and its functions remain little known, acknowledged but unexamined. 
Questions abound on the subject regarding the motivations behind the 
undertaking of such a drastic measure that seemed to run contrary to the 
traditional course of British constitutional history, how this shift affected the 
British people, how the government handled their newly acquired power, and 
what the legacy of DORA was. The purpose of this work is to answer these 
questions by tracing the antecedents of DORA and the transformations it 
underwent, as well as its application to the nation during the First World War 
and its impact upon subsequent British history. This will be done in this 
chapter by tracing such antecedents in three fields — in the use of the military to 
keep civil order, the censorship of the press in wartime, and in prewar policy 
discussions over the military's authority to requisition land for military purposes. 
Such an approach helps to emphasize the broad range of areas that the Act 
covered as well as the extent of its powers, powers that laid the groundwork for 
further, even more intrusive intervention by the state into the lives of its 
citizens. 
Unless specified in the text, reference to the Act will mean the version 
passed in March 1915, the 6nal version of the general series of Acts to be 
passed. 
Though DORA's existence seems to stand out in sharp relief to the 
previous course of British history, the act was hardly a radical break with past 
policy. While it did represent a new departure, its foundations were laid in the 
nineteenth century as the British government began to look for new ways to 
maintain security in troubled times. DORA's antecedents can be seen in two 
fields, the first being labor relations and the response to labor unrest. Until the 
early nineteenth century, the state relied on the blunt tool of military force to 
put down civil unrest. Incidents such as Peterloo-a notorious event where 
British troops fired on an open air meeting gathered to hear the radical orator 
Henry Hunt speak- in 1819 caused government officials to rethink these 
policies. While easily capable of suppressing dissent, soldiers were usually 
viewed as servants of the state acting on its behalf instead of an impartial group 
designed to enforce the law, a perception which hindered their ability to keep 
the peace without resorting to violence. This led the state in 1829 to entrust 
the maintenance of public order to a newly created civil force-the police. 
However, the military still played a role in controlling large public disturbances, 
as there were few police forces with the manpower necessary for handling such 
problems and the massive show of force helped to support the police and allay 
the fears of local authorities, ' 
The first major use of the military in its reduced role occurred with the 
' Stanley H. Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. 5. 
rise of the Chartist movement in the late 1830s and early 1840s. The protests 
came in three waves; the first, in 1839-40, saw a military deployment far out of 
proportion to the handful of violent incidents which were easily suppressed, 
allowing for the rapid restoration of order. The Plug Plot disturbances in 
northwest England during July 1842 saw a far greater use of physical force on 
both sides. The riots involved a series of strikes by coal miners in north 
Staffordshire, initially over the redress of work-related grievances, but soon 
evolving into a general anti-state protest embracing aspects of Chartist protest 
that spread into Cheshire and Lancanshire, The inadequacy of the Staffordshire 
police force and their inability to stop tbe riots resulted in Whiteh&'s dispatch 
of over 2, 000 soldiers to the area, who were able to reassert state control by the 
end of August. Over 8, 000 troops were also deployed throughout London 
during the final wave of Chartism in 1848, but both the London march and 
subsequent Chartist protests that year proved anticlimactic. ' The demise of 
Chartism decreased the threat that labor action posed to the state, and almost a 
half-century would pass before the military would again be called out in force in 
aid of civil authorities. 
The key to its use was the rise of organized labor in the 1880s, a 
phenomenon which created a sense of panic among government officials not felt 
Palmer, ch. 11; Robert Fyson, ''The Crisis of 1842: Cbartism, the 
Collie'rs' Strike and the Outbreak in the Potteries, " in 7he Chartist experience: 
Studies in Working-Class Radicalism and Culture, 1B30-60, ed. James Epstein and 
Dorothy Thompson (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 194-220. 
since the Chartist movement. Such protests were viewed as what one leading 
economist of the time termed "industrial treason. "4 Yet by this time Whitehall 
was increasingly reluctant to use military force to control civil unrest, because of 
the political damage such deployments caused. Local authorities had no such 
qualms, however. Periods of civil unrest necessitated increases in the forces 
needed to control them. The opfions available to the local officials were 
limited; increasing the nmnbers of police by caHing in additional constables from 
other areas, deputizing people to serve as law enforcement officials, and 
deploying soldiers. Of these, the use of the military was the most attractive 
since it cost nothing (other forces having to be pmd for out of local funds) while 
providing "a quick and effective means of bringing a disturbance to an end. "' 
This first became apparent with the Featherstone strike of 1893 in Yorkshire, 
where the local constabulary was overwhelmed and troops were despatched to 
deal with the miners. As a result, military force began to be used once more in 
order to quell civil unrest. 
But the use of military force came with a price — the loss of local control. 
This was first evident during the South Wales miners' strike of 1910, which 
started over an argument about wage differentials and soon spread beyond the 
ability of the local police to control, As a result, the Chief Constable of 
4 W. Stanley Jevons, The State in Relation to Labor (London: MacmiHan 
and Co. , 1882), p. 131. 
s Barbara Weinberger, Keeping the Peace? (New York: Berg, 1991), p. 4 
Glamorgan, Captain Lionel Liadsay, requested support from the Home Oflice 
in the form of both the Metropolitan police and armed soldiers. After some 
initial hesitation on the part of the War Of6ce, the Home Secretary, Winston 
Churchill, seat in troops to assist the 11, 000 police already there to maintain 
order. The military connnander, General Nevil Macready was soon equipped 
with the authority to take control "of all the police and military on the spot" if 
the local of6cials requested military intervention. This gave Macready sole 
authority over the situation. But while Macready's powers were great, Churchill 
"kept the extent aad form of military intervention under exceptionally strict 
political control, "6 establishing speci6c parameters for the use of troops and 
dispatching a special Home Of6ce representative, J. F. Moylan, to supervise 
Macready's conduct. In the ead, Macready succeeded in keeping the peace 
through an impartial approach that involved superseding the authority the local 
police (who were taking their orders from the mine owners) and by implying 
that he could obtain a commission to act as military governor, something that 
neither side wanted to see. ~ 
The miners' strike of 1910 established two important precedents, each at 
s Charles Townshend, Making the Peace (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), p. 42-3. 
' Weinberger, Keeping the Peace?, ch. 3; Charles Townshend, "'One Man 
Whom You Can Hang If Necessary': The Discreet Charm of Nevil Macready, " 
in 7yre Linrirarions of Military Power, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Malcolm H. 
Murfett (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 143-53. 
different levels: First, Churchill's policy removed the duties of keeping the peace 
from the hands of local authorities for the Qrst time since the reintroduction of 
military force in civil peacekeeping, thus increasing the amount of control 
Whitehall had over the situation. Second, Macready's stance implied that the 
state stood above the dispute, favoring neither side-a fact that impressed 
strikers used to seeing policemen acting oa behalf of the mine owners and that 
undoubtedly played a critical role in maintaining peace. Though the entire 
episode proved costly to the Treasury, and failed to provide immediate 
resolution to the strike (which dragged on until September, 1911), Whitehall's 
new role was established. 
While these responses to labor indicated the new role that the state was 
beginning to play, they were aH measures occasioned by the crises at hand. 
Although traditional boundaries were broken and new precedents established, it 
was always on a temporary, case-to-case basis. What the military began to seek 
in the 1880s was the outlining of statutory emergency powers for time of war. 
Some powers were already detailed in the statutes; the Defence Acts of 1842- 
1873 gave tbe armed forces tbe legal right to requisition land, but as these laws 
were applicable ia peacetime as weH as during wars, their powers were 
restricted by legal procedure. 9 Both sides stated their dissatisfactioa with the 
s Weinberger, Keeping the Peace?, ch. 3. 
' Leslie Scott and Alfred Hildesley, The Case of Requisition (Oxford: 
Clareadon Press, 1920), pp. 10-3, 35-41. Another option lay in the use of the 
laws: the Treasury Solicitor commented that, "the owner has really no voice at 
all, "«while the army thought tbe powers both hmited and restrictive. What the 
military command wanted was "a statute conferring on them extensive powers to 
take steps necessary for the defence and security of the realm, both in the 
critical period pending a major conflict and after the outbreak of war. "» 
Accordingly, at tbe behest of Colonel John Ardagh a bill was drafted in 1888 to 
place such measures into law, though the government set it aside to be passed 
when circumstances would later demand it. Dissatis6ed with this decision, the 
War Of6ce attempted to push the measure through in 1891 and in 1895, both 
times encountering the opposition of Courtney Ilbert, the parliamentary 
draughtsman. Ilbert thought the measure unnecessary, arguing in a 
memorandum in 1896 that, 
. . . any attempt to specify in detail and to express in statutory language 
the powers exercisable by the civil and military authorities under such 
circumstances might throw doubt on the prerogative powers of the 
Crown, and would probably involve the imposition of restrictions and 
limitations which would be inconvenient and misleading, and which in 
Royal Prerogative, as de6ned in the famous cases 77te Case of Saltpetre (1606) 
and R v, Hampden (1637), though, while this classic authority was used to 
condone state actions during court cases, it proved a far more tenuous basis for 
justifying state requisitions. 
«TS 27/62, "Note on the Compulsory Procedures for taking land 
possessed by the Secretary of State for War, dated 1902. " Cited in G. R. Rubin, 
'Tbe War Of6ce and Contingency Legal Planning, 1885-1914, " in 77te Political 
Context of Law, ed, Richard Eales and David Sullivan (London: The Hambledon 
Press, 1987), p. 147. 
Rubin, 'The War Of6ce and Contingency Legal Planning, " p, 149. 
practice it would be necessary to disregard. » 
The military disagreed, arguing that to exercise powers at the discretion of 
military officers (as Ilbert suggested) exposed these officers to legal proceedings, 
as well as the need to have a statutory framework in place for the contingency 
wartime planning the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID) was then 
conducting. However, the onset of other problems, namely those identified by 
the Boer War, caused the military command to set aside the creation of a 
formal policy for the time being. 
Yet while the outbreak of war in South Africa forced a postponement in 
the establishment of a formal policy, the Boer conflict, along with the other 
conflicts prior to the First World War, raised the issue of press censorship. At 
the start of the Boer War, Sir Evelyn Wood, Adjutant General at the War 
Of6ce, proposed that the Service departments control all military information 
during national emergencies. His suggestion was prompted by what he saw as 
"the feverish competition of modern journalists to obtain news which will 
interest the enormous reading public they cater for, " and wanted to prevent the 
enemy I'rom gaining sensitive information as a result of their efforts. Wood's 
political superiors rejected his proposal as being too dif6cult of an issue to pass 
through Parliament, with George Wyndham arguing that field censorship 
» WO 32/7112, "Emergency Powers. Memorandum by C. P. Ilbert, 5 
August 1896, " para. 2. Cited in Rubin, "The War Office and Contingency Legal 
Planning, " p. 151. 
10 
regulations were suf6cient to prevent such leakage. » The CID attempted to 
pass similar legislation in 1905, prompted by Japanese use of Russian press 
releases as a source of military intelligence during their war in Asia, but in spite 
of their efforts to drum up support from the press itself, the bill died once more 
because of governmental fears of Parliamentary reaction. 
It was only in the aftermath of the Agadir crisis in 1911 that questions of 
press censorship were resolved. The Morning Post's article on forti6cations on 
the East Coast brought about renewed efforts by the War Of6ce to seek some 
form of press restriction. They dispatched Sir Reginald Brade, Permanent 
Secretary at the War Of6ce, to meet with members of the Newspaper 
Proprietors' Association (NPA) in order to negotiate an agreement allowing 
some form of restriction acceptable to all, Brade's efforts resulted in a 
conference between representatives of the Services and the NPA which 
established a Joint Standing Committee comprised of members from the War 
Of6ce, the Admiralty, and the Press Committee. This standing committee had 
the power, upon reference by either department, to screen information, with the 
press voluntarily agreeing to accept the committee's decisions as 6nal. This 
agreement, along with the passage of the Oflicial Secrets Act the year before, 
» WO 32/6. 381, Memorandum by Sir Evelyn Wood, 1 March 1899. 
Quoted in Colin Lovelace, "British press censorship during the First World 
War, " in Newspaper History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day, eds. 
George Boyce, James Curran, and Pauline Wingate (London: Constable, 1978), 
p. 308. 
helped address the Services' concerns and the matter was considered resolved. " 
The settling of the press issue coincided with a renewed effort by the 
military command to obtain legislation expanding their legal powers in time of 
war. In 1911 several members of the War Office sought to gain the support of 
the Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane, on the matter. Haldane, 
however, adopted Ilbert's old stance, stating that the measure was not needed. 
The issue rested there until 1913 when Ha]dane's successor, Colonel J. E. B. 
Seely, referred the matter to his staff. Colonel G. M. W. MacDonough wrote a 
memorandmn in July assailing Ilbert's doctrine, but once more the civilian legal 
advisors to the government, this time Attorney General Rufus Issacs and 
Solicitor General Sir John Simon adopted Ilbert's defense of the status quo. 
MacDonough pressed on, supported by General Sir Henry Wilson, the Director 
of Military Operations and Brigadier-General David Henderson, Director of 
Military Training. He succeeded in having prime Minister Herbert Henry 
Asrluith refer the matter to a CID subcommittee in November, though the 
committee did not meet until 30 June 1914. MacDonough drew up a list of the 
powers that the Army felt were necessary to have by statute, only to encounter 
Simon's opposition once more. Simon recognized the need to convince of6cers 
that they were acting lawfully, but he believed that this could be accomplished 
through a proclamation, a move which the War Of6ce representative at the 
'4 Ibid, p. 309. 
12 
meeting declared satisfactory. " 
The CID subcommittee meeting occurred two days after the assassination 
of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, though the immediate 
prospect of war was on tbe minds of few at tbe time. When war came, instead 
of drafting a proclamation, the Secretary of tbe CID, Colonel Maurice Hankey, 
began to develop regulations. Reginald McKenna, as Home Secretary, 
presented the regulations in the form of a bill to the House of Commons on 
August 7, three days after Britain's declaration of war. «Despite the exent of 
the bill's provisions and its lax drafting, there was practically no debate, with 
only two questions asked by a single member. " There was even less notice 
taken in the House of Lords, where the bill was processed through its three 
readings without a murmur. The Defence of the Realm Act was passed "in that 
spirit of decision and confidence which. . . marked the war measures of this 
Parliament, " with no consideration for legal proprieties or libertarian concerns. « 
Yet the question remains: why did the government seek an act instead of 
Rubin, 'The War Office and Contingency Legal Planning, " p. 153. 
«Sir John (later Viscount) Simon's later statement, that the legislation 
"had been carefully prepared beforehand" is nusleading. Viscount Simon, 
Retrospect (London: Hutchinson & Co. , 1952), p. 104. 
'7 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Fifth Series, (hereafter H. C. Debs, 
5th ser. ) vol. LXXI (1914) cols. 2191-2194. . 
" H. M. Bowman, "Martial Law and the English Constitution, " Michigan 
Law Review, XV:2 (December 1916): p. 93. 
13 
simply issue a proclamation? This is a line of inquiry which still has not been 
thoroughly explored in the subsequent literature on DORA; its most recent 
investigator, G. R. Rubin stated that "(a) full explanation for this complete shift 
awaits further investigation. "» Yet it is still possible to discern some potential 
answers. First, the opinion of one War Office representative is not necessarily 
that of the whole armed forces, and there may have been some of6cers who still 
preferred formal authority to be designated in statute. Second, a proclamation 
may not have fulfdled what the War Oflice desired. Simon's argument at the 30 
June meeting was that the powers already existed in common law to achieve 
what the War Oflice wanted and that the proclamation was more to "reassure a 
timid General Of6cer" than to delegate new powers in response to war. In this 
sense, DORA was an extremely farsighted measure, for as time and the DORA 
regulations were to show, what the state eventually needed went far beyond 
Simon's original vision. ~ 
The act was revised two weeks later, ostensibly to correct "certain 
omissions" that resulted from the rapid pace at which the original legislation was 
drawn up. On 24 August, McKenna introduced a bill in the Commons to 
amend DORA so as to allow courts-martial for civilians who violated 
regulations adopted "to prevent the spread of reports likely to cause disaffection 
Rubin, 'The War Of6ce and Contingency Legal planning, " p. 155. 
~ Ibid, 
14 
or alarm, " as well as those which secured military training and deployment 
areas. For the first time some doubts were voiced about the bill, as one 
member, the radical Liberal Charles Trevelyan, felt that the language of the 
amendment was of "somewhat vague import" and might be used to ban any 
speech or writings contrary to the state. McKenna's promise that the bill would 
not be used for such a purpose quickly ended the debate, and the amending bill 
passed out of the Commons on 26 August, with the Lords approving it the day 
afterwards. » 
Though the amendment was designed to ensure the legality of the bill, it 
has been pointed out since that the first two DORA acts were so flawed in their 
writing that many of the actions carried out under its authority remained illegal, 
The argument was made by J. H. Morgan, a professor of law at University 
College, London, in a book he coauthored in 1915 with Thomas Baty. In it, 
Morgan argued that under the original act and its first amendment "the Defence 
of the Realm Act could not confer the arbitrary power upon the executive 
which it assumed. " According to Morgan, the language only gave the state the 
power to regulate areas defined iu the original act: communications with the 
enemy, the obtaining of information that aided the enemy or harmed British 
forces, the spreading of alarmist reports, the safety of communications, or the 
suspension of restrictions on land acquisition. As for regulations regarding 
» H. C. Debs, 5th ser. , vol. LXVI (1914), cols. 89-87, 
15 
other matters, Morgan announced that "(f)or four months we have been living 
under decrees from the. . . authorities which were absolutely illegal. 'n 
Morgan's argument is founded on the wording "His Majesty in Council 
has power. . . to issue regulations as to the powers and duties of the Admiralty 
and Army Council. " This, Morgan states, is simply in regards to the existing 
powers of the Army Council in common law rather than the assignment of new 
powers, He advances two possibilities for the vagueness of the language; first, 
that it was deliberate because of the political sensitivity of granting such 
powers, and second, that the intent was to restrict the powers to those specified 
in the original act and that subsequent interpretations went beyond the initial 
intentions of the government. The second interpretation would certainly justify 
the prewar concerns of the lawyers wbo opposed the military's attempts to 
expand their statutory powers. However, as no record has been left of the 
intentions of the authors or of the government in regards to the initial 
legislation, historians can only speculate as to the true reason. 23 
The next revision came in November. The third Defence of the Realm 
Act combined the first two bills and changed the wording in order to give the 
state the formal statutory power to issue any regulations in defense of the 
realm, thus correcting tbe oversights of the August acts. In addition, the death 
~ Thomas Baty and I, H, Morgan, Wart Its Conduct and Legal Results 
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1915), pp. 101, 102. 
u Ibid, p. 101; Rubin, 'The Political Context of Law, " pp. 156-7 
16 
penalty was added to the punishments which could be meted out by the courts- 
martial. This proposal encountered strong opposition in the House of Lords as 
it had been two hundred and fifty years since civilian courts had possessed the 
power to sentence a person to death without a trial by jury. Three members of 
the upper house combined to oppose the bill: Lord Halsbuiy, Lord Loreburn 
(both former Lord Chancellors), and Viscount Bryce, a former ambassador, 
Halsbury declared that the act'was the "most unconstitutional thing that has 
ever happened in this country, " and argued that the bill should be amended to 
allow British subjects to be tried in civil courts. Bryce echoed Halsbuiy's 
protest, viewing the issue of being one where British subjects should be tried in 
civil court "when there is a civil court to tiy him. " Yet despite these weighty 
protests, the bill passed through the Lords untouched, the only concessions 
made to the concerns of the three lords being the Lord Chancellor's promise 
that ao British subject would be put to death except for a crime of high 
treason, t4 
Parliament did not address DORA for another three months, In 
February, 1915, the government introduced a bill that moderated the earlier 
measures, giving civil offenders the right to a trial in civil courts; with the caveat 
that should there be an "invasion or special military emergency" the King could 
si Parfiamerttary Debates (Lords), Fifth series, (hereafter H, L. Debs) vol. 
XVIII (1914), cols. 201-224; Lindsay Rogers, "The War aad the English 
Constitution. " The Forum, LIV (July 1915), p. 31. 
17 
reinstate the imposition of a military judiciary by proclamation. The 
significance of the new amendment, however, was in the speech delivered by its 
sponsor, Attorney-General Sir John Simon. In his address to Parliament, Simon 
acknowledged that DORA was "an extremely novel proposal, " and while there 
was a clear need for, the act, the bill and his comments suggested that perhaps 
the government had "gone beyond what was necessary. " He countered those 
who felt that DORA "violated constitutional tradition" with the argument that it 
represented "adequate and representative steps against a great national 
danger, "2s 
The new bill sparked for the first time a full debate of DORA's 
measures. The Unionist Party strongly supported the bill, with their leader in 
the Commons, Andrew Bonar Law, declaring that "at a time like this powers of 
dictatorship must be given to the government, " although he hoped that the 
government would "as far as possible stick to the old custom. "26 Edward Carson, 
Simon's successor as Attorney-General, agreed with Bonar Law, stating that 
"(t)he government must have whatever powers they asked for. "» Yet there were 
some on the Liberal benches who felt that the govermnent had gone too far. 
One member, a Sir Ryland Adkins, moved an amendment that would allow for 
» H. C, Debs, 5th ser, vol. LXX (1915), col. 28. 
37te Times, 16 February 1915, p. 10. 
7he Times, 25 February 1915, p. 12. 
18 
courts-martial only when civil courts (with their provisions for trial by jury) were 
unavailable, which would deny the state the right to try civil offenders in special 
emergency cases, The government successfully defeated the amendment, but 
Adkins' measure suggested that not everybody felt secure with the transfer of so 
much power into the hands of the state. 2s 
Though the DOR Act of March 1915 was the last major revision of the 
Act in Parliament, it was not the last time that its scope was increased. 
Throughout the war regulations were issued which allowed the state to further 
its authority, and new ministries were created to administer the additional 
authority that DORA gave to the state. Yet the Act did more than just expand 
state power. Often DORA became a vehicle of circumventing parliamentary 
opposition to a measure, as bills that encountered opposition were withdrawn 
only "to reappear a few days later in the form of a DORA regulation. " 
Parliamentary control diminished with DORA, as "the focus of lawmaking 
authority shifted from Parliament to the Cabinet. " Even the authority of the 
courts to check state action was restricted, as Britain became a country 
governed by administrative decree. ~ 
This was by no means a gradual evolution of power. After an initial 
spate of regulations (primarily in the realm of property rights), the use of 
2s H. C, Debs, 5th ser. vol. LXX, cols, 670-759. 
» Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 163, 156. 
19 
DORA as a governing tool diminished. The perception was that the European 
conflict would be a quick war, quickly won, Yet as time went on and tbe 
demands of the new warfare waged in France grew, the need for stiH further 
powers grew, By 1916, a number of commissions were established to explore 
expanding DORA's authority and its use as a tool to govern the nation. It was 
only with the fall of Asquith in December 1916 and David Lloyd George' s 
succession to the premiership, however, that the full powers of the Act were 
completely utilized to confirm the state's control over virtually every aspect of 
daily life. It is this growth and administration that this narrative wiH focus on in 




Property rights are one of the most integral parts of the British constitution. 
Long before civil liberties became an issue to the British people, property rights 
were debated and legislated, From Magna Charta onward, the assertion of the 
rights of the aristocracy vis a vis the monarchy involved a claim for property 
rights because of the position of property as the cornerstone of that group's 
power. As the centuries passed property came to be seen by the British people 
as the cornerstone of the aristocracy's power, providing both value and stability 
to the owner. By the eighteenth century, few doubted that power followed 
property, with even such hallowed concepts as liberty deemed to be of lesser 
signi6cance. Even the effects of the Industrial Revolution served only to 
reemphasize the importance of property, with its preeminence accepted by the 
newly-successful groups in Britain and reaflirmed by numerous laws and 
measures. 
Yet in spite of the preeminence of property rights in the English 
constitution, these rights were sacritlced in the name of the war effort. Property 
control went from a form of tyrany to the cornerstone of DORA's power. As 
noted in Chapter One, discussions of the question of property rights and 
government requisitioning was critical to the creation of the Defence of the 
Realm Act, and one of the powers assigned through the Act from the outset 
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was that of requisition, This chapter will examine DORA's role in property 
issues, detailing the speci6c property regulations authored and how these 
regulations were administered during the war, Since there were many who 
questioned the powers the state exercised regarding property rights, the key 
court battles over property rights will also be covered, showing the constitutional 
arguments involved and how the Government's reaction to such challenges 
reveals its views on the subject, both for the First World War and subsequent 
British constitutional development. 
The issue of property requisitioning was one of the 6rst to be addressed 
by the Defence of the Realm Act regulations. Regulation 2, which was among 
the 6rst set of regulations issued, permitted the government to requisition land 
or "do any other act involving interference with private rights of property which 
is necessary. . . " for the conduct of the war. ' Additional regulations were 
subsequently issued which extended these powers to tbe commandeering of 
speci6c materiel, ranging from natural resources to processed goods and the 
factories in which they were produced. Yet as tbe War progressed tbe need 
arose for a more speci6c law that went beyond the temporaty measures outlined 
under the original Acts. The result was the Defence of the Realm (Acquisition 
of Land) Act of 1916, which established measures allowing for the permanent 
Regulations 1 through 9 were issued on November 28, 1914. 
Alexander Pulling, ed. Defence of the Realm Manual, 5th edition (London: 
HMSO, 1918), p. 40. 
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acquisition of government property after the war, with compensation set at the 
value of the property from the time of seizure, This is significant in that it 
indicates the importance that property requisitioning assumed for British policy, 
since passage of the (Acquisition of Land) Act put requisitioning on firmer 
constitutional footing as well as guaranteed control over the properly 
requisitioned. 
This new power was not unleashed without some attempts to mitigate its 
effects. Indeed, the first regulation issued stressed that "the enjoyment of 
property will be interfered with as little as may be permitted" under the 
circumstances of the conflict. The government understood as well the need to 
recompense the property owners, and during the debates over the March 
DORA amendment, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, 
promised that compensation would be available for the: 
conduct of naval or military operations; for assisting the food supply; and 
promoting the continuance of trade, industry, business and 
communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against 
risk; the financing of the purchase and re-sale of foodstuffs and 
materials, or otherwise; for relief of distress, and generally for all 
expenses arising out of a state of war. ~ 
Compensation was primarily tendered through an initial offer based on the 
value of the property involved. 3 However, it was recognized that this amount 
' H. C, Debs, 5th ser. , vol. LXX (1915), col. 1459. 
' For purposes of discussion, "property" refers to land, buildings, and 
chattel owned by an individual or a group of individuals. 
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would not be satisfactory in every circumstance, possibly causing the property 
owner to seek recourse through an appeal to the courts. To address this 
problem, which threatened the entire use of property requisitioning, a Defence 
of the Realm Losses Commission (DRLC) was set up on 31 March 1915, to 
establish what amount should be paid out to those citizens suffering costs 
"through the exercise by the Crown of its rights and duties in the defence of tbe 
realm. "4 Though an of6cial commission, it was a non-statutory body and thus 
possessed a legally questionable existence which might not have stood up to 
court challenges. ' Furthermore, it used a different basis for calculatiou. of 
compensation than earlier, more generous measures which dealt with outright 
and permanent acquisition of land by the state rather than a disruption of 
business. As result, the DRLC made these payments on an ex gratia, or 
voluntary, basis rather than out of any legal obligation, while most people 
"cheerfully" accepted them in part because of the perceived lack of alternatives. ' 
These payments were an issue which would prove to be the major point of 
contention for property holders and would result in many administrative 
4 Quoted in G. R. Rubin, Private Property, Government Requisition and 
the Constitution, 1914-1927 (London: The Hambledon Press, 1994) p. 179. 
' There were two proposals later in the war to put some form of losses 
commission (either general or relating speci6cally to land acquisition), though 
they were both dropped in the belief that such measures might not pass 
Parliament, thus undermining government requisition efforts, Ibid, p. 64-8. 
' Samuel J. Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great Britain (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 152. 
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challenges and legal problems for the government both during and after the 
The government wasted no time putting its long-sought authority to use, 
laying claim to property it deemed necessary to wage war against Germany. 
This authority was granted to officers in a number of departments and 
ministries, primarily the War Of6ce and the Admiralty, with each branch 
exercising the powers based on its own needs. No one individual or ministry 
was granted exclusive authority or placed in overall charge of seizing property; 
rather, each ministry or department requisitioned territory using its own 
requirements and guidelines. This lack of a coherent, unified approach towards 
the whole issue of property requisitioning threatened to become a legal problem 
of massive portions as a result. It was only the acquiescence of the vast 
majority of people whose property was being seized that prevented a host of 
legal challenges from being filed that, if the result of the cases actually pursued 
is any indication, would have resulted in even higher costs and seriously 
threatened the state's ability to use requisitioning as a policy. 
This is not to say that requisitioning still did not occur without problems. 
A few prominent of6cials, particularly employees on the Losses Commission, 
identified several areas where government management of property 
requisitioning could have been improved, Much of the property acquired by the 
Ministry of Munitions and the Office of Works, according to one Lands Branch 
officer, was secured without regard to cost. The War Office, on the other hand, 
adopted a more fiscally conservative approach by seizing the property and 
leaving compensation to the DRLC, which negotiated the sum paid. 
Interdepartmental rivalries often played themselves out in requisition issues, 
thus making pracbcai decisions which would lead to greater efficiency 
impossible to carry out, Finally, existing resources, such as the Inland Revenue 
Land Valuation Department, were not used by the War Office and other 
agencies when assessing claims, something often resulting in higher costs for the 
state. ' 
These problems, however, paled in comparison with the greater 
difficulties posed by challenges in court, which threatened to erect 
insurmountable legal obstacles to the use of property requisitioning. The first 
major court case involved the Shoreham Aerodrome, which the War Office 
commandeered on 24 December 1914 for training purposes, Located near 
Brighton, the airfield had been used by the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) on a 
limited basis since 1913 through a tenancy agreement. In May 1914 the field's 
owners, The Brighton-Shoreham Aerodrome Ltd, decided to terminate the lease 
as of 3 Januaty 1915, because the rent the War Office paid was less than the 
amount private customers were charged. As with so many other things, the 
outbreak of the war changed the situation, and based on the recommendation of 
an inspection team the War Office requisitioned the field under Regulation 2, 
r Tilney Barton, Zhe Life of a Country Lawyer in Peace and War-time 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1937). 
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with compensation to be determined later. While the company's owners had no 
intention of denying the use of the aerodrome to the war effort, they felt that 
the government's subsequent offer to pay Z1, 500 in rent per year and a 
depreciation rate totaling X1, 500 when the RFC left, was too low, arguing that 
the RFC's exclusive tenancy would cost the aerodrome its existing tenants and 
prevent them from seeking new ones for the duration of the war. The company 
sought compensation under the older Defence Act of 1842, which authorized 
bearings before a jury to determine amounts owed by the state to property 
owners in case of non-contracted seizures. ' The owners asked for a X5, 000 
premium and an additional f2, 000 per year, in essence seeking for 
compensation for monies lost rather than any ex gratia payment 9 
Despite the government's persistent efforts, the company chose to settle 
the Shoreham case through the courts rather than the recently established 
DRLC, making this the 5rst DORA case to be argued before the court. 
Representing the company, Leslie Frederic Scott argued four points: whether a 
threat existed to public safety that necessitated takeover, whether payment was 
a right under statute, whether acquisition under the royal prerogative was legal 
and — if so — whether compensation was a legally required part of that power, 
Tbe company's aryunents were rejected by the court, which in its initial 
s Quoted in Scott and Hildesley, The Case of Requisition, p. 38. 
9 Rubin, Private Properly, p, 39-42. 
judgement of 7 July 1915 affirmed DORA's "absolute and unconditional power" 
to seize property. Though this ruling was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal, 
the government settled the case before appellate hearings were completed in 
the House of Lords in the following year, with the settlement arranged "on 
terms which effectively vindicated the company's legal argument. "" The abrupt 
decision to withdrawal resulted from indications that the Lords would rule in 
favor of the aerodrome's owners, and it left the government scrambling for a 
legal footing which would spare them the enormous sums needed to compensate 
other dissatisfied property holders. 
Though the case involving Shoreham Aerodrome was the first legal 
challenge to DORA's powers of property seizure, it was by no means the most 
important. The case which holds that distinction is that of Attorney-General v 
De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd. [1920], which dealt with the requisitioning of a 
hotel to house the headquarters staff of the RFC. Once again, the case was not 
over the legal right to take over the property, but the matter of compensation to 
its legal owner. Located in London, De Keyser's Royal Hotel relied upon 
business from foreigners and was quite successful until the outbreak of the war 
ended this source of income. As early as 29 April 1915 the hotel's owners 
decided to contact the War Oflice about renting out the hotel as government 
w Ibid, p, 52. The Crown's apparent imnunent defeat came despite the 
assistance of the emminent jurist, Albert Vena Dicey, former Vinerian Professor 
of Law at Oxford, in what was to prove his last appearance before the bar. 
accommodations, only to be turned down over the f30, 000 per year price, As a 
result of their failure to secure occupants, the hotel went into receivership on 25 
June, 1915, and despite restructuring efforts continued to lose money, In April 
1916, however, the War OKce decided to consolidate the headquarters' staff of 
the RFC under one roof and chose De Keyser's as the most opportune location. 
Initial negotiations with Arthur Whinney, the receiver/manager of the hotel, 
deadlocked once more over the question of the rent, with the War Of6ce 
balking at the f19, 000 per year offer made by Whinney. The need for the 
location brought an end to negotiations, and on I May the hotel was simply 
requisitioned under Regulation 2 of DORA, with the terms of settlement to be 
worked out later, « 
Though the War Oflice wanted to refer the matter of compensation to 
the DRLC, Whinney felt that the commission did not award claims to 
businesses which were running at a loss at the time of their take over. After 
further negotiations proved fruitless, the debtholders and company directors 
intervened, reluctantly deciding at a meeting on 20 September to present a 
petition of right to be pursued, "if necessary. . . to the House of Lords. " The 
War Of6ce's continuing refusal to negotiate forced the company's hand, and on 
17 February 1917, the company presented its petition of right. It sought annual 
payment of rent, the sum of f13, 520 lls. 1d for back rent from 8 May 1916 to 
Ibid, p. 76-9; Scott and Hildesley, The Case of Requisirion, p, 1-2. . 
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14 February 1917 (or aa evaluation to determine a fair amount for the rent), a 
declaration as to the validity of De Keyser's case uader the Defense Act of 1842 
and compensatioa under its provisions, and a statement as to tbe petitioners' 
rights to the property. Though it was obvious that De Keyser's sought an out- 
of-court settlement, the government refused to meet the company's terms and 
no settlemeat was forthcoming. " 
The government's decision to contest the company's petition despite the 
result of the Shoreham case was a questionable one given that a ruling in favor 
of De Keyser jeopardized their entire practice of property requisitioning, 
However, there were factors which argued ia favor of a court challenge. The 
inital rulings supported their side, as justices arguing the case could only have 
considered the last ruling on the Shoreham case in their deliberations, which 
was a favorable one for the state. In addition, a settlement might have 
encouraged additional petitions, undermining the ex gratia compensation 
structure that existed. As a result, the government stood firm and the petition 
was heard in the Chancery Court oa 20-22 March, 1918, a delay of over a year 
which was aot unwelcome by the governmeat. The justice bearing the case 
followed expectations by adheriag to the interpretation of the Court of Appeals 
ia the Shorebam case, upholding the government's argument that the seizure 
was indeed justified and necessary for the defense of the realm. The case then 
u Rubia, Private property, p. 83-5. 
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went to the Court of Appeal on 20 July, where two successive adjournments 
were granted for the Crown counsel to review documents on land occupation. 
The adjournments lasted through the signing of the Armistice of 11 November, 
1918, and three weeks after the end of hostilities the government agreed to end 
the search of documents and proceeded with the case. » 
The hearing resumed on 9 January, 1919 in a different environment. 
The pressures of the war were gone, and the constitutional issues regarding 
property rights played a greater role in the decision. In a 2-1 judgement 
delivered on 9 April, the Court of Appeal held that "the Supplicants [were] 
entitled to a fair rent for use and occupation of De Keyser's Royal Hotel. . . by 
way of compensation under the Defense Act of 1842, " a rent due to the hotel as 
a matter of right and not as one of ex gratia. After hearing the Crown's appeal 
for ten weeks, the House of Lords dismissed the government's case in March 
1920, thus enshrining the judgement in British constitutional law. '4 While the 
ruling damaged the government's position in seizing property, the timing left it 
in a better position than it would have been had the decision been handed down 
during the middle of the war. 
Though both the Shoreham and De Keyser cases would prove extremely 
signi6cant to British constitutional history in their rejection of royal prerogative 
» Scott and Hildesley, 7he Case of Requisition, p. 3-7. 
'4 Ibid, p. 8, 
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claims over the rights of citizens, they were not the only legal challenges facing 
DORA's property requisitioning powers during the war, The state faced 
challenges in several areas, most notably in dealing with the liquor industty. 
Though requisitioning was only one aspect of a larger approach towards the 
question of drink during tbe War (to be addressed in the next chapter), it came 
under attack iu several lawsuits during the war, The Cannon Brewery Company 
Ltd. , which had their property seized on 22 December 1915 as part of the 
government's attempts to control liquor, challenged the amount of 
compensation awardedds They sought compensation under the Lands Clauses 
Act of 1845, which guaranteed an additional ten percent above the value of the 
property, instead of under the terms of the Defence of the Realm (Acquisition 
of Land) Act of 1916 which, as noted earlier, set compensation at tbe value of 
the property. Despite the government's attempts to delay matters, a hearing 
was held before Mr. Justice Younger in May and June 1917 which, while 
affirming the decisions of the Shoreham case up to that point, referred the 
matter to arbitration and resulted in future claims being settled by direct 
agreement, « 
The other major requisitioning case dealing with alcohol concerned a 
tradition reaching far back into British history: the rum ration of the Royal 
» The property seized was the Ordnance Arms, a pub in Enfield Lock. 
" Rubin, Private Property, ch. 7. 
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Navy. The practice of giving rum to sailors was still followed in the Navy at the 
start of the war. The conditions of the war posed a dual challenge to the supply 
of rum by increasing the number of people receiving it while cutting back on its 
availability through importation. By 1917 the concern over this was such that 
on 6 October the Admiralty gave notice to Newcastle Breweries Ltd of the 
decision to seize 239 puncheons (a puncheon being a cask of anywhere from 72 
to 120 gallons) from their stocks under Regulation 2B of the Act. The 
company, however, refused the government's offer of payment (cost plus 
expenses and 5 percent interest) or thee option of referring the matter to the 
DRLC, choosing instead to submit a petition of right in the courts. Though 
such a petition was Sled in May 1918, the matter was of little concern to the 
government, because Newcastle Breweries had not f0ed. suit on the matter, 
possibly in expectation of settling the entire matter out of court. Such a 
settlement was not forthcoming, and when a decision was handed down by the 
court on 20 February, 1920, the compensation provision in Regulation 2B was 
declared ultra vires, further undermining the settlement structure established 
during the war and threatening a debt-burdened postwar government with even 
greater costs. " 
Such legal challenges threatened the state's ability effectively to 
prosecute the war, and warranted additional legislation in peacetime, in effect, 
'~ Ibid, ch. 8. 
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to "clean up" after the chaos created by the Act. This is a matter for a later 
chapter. However, it is important to keep such litigation in perspective. As 
threatening as they were to government policies and the powers of the state, 
legal challenges to DORA's requisitioning powers proved a distinct minority of 
the cases involving requisition. The majority of people who faced property 
seizure under the Act accepted the settlements handed down by the state. 
Between the establishment of the Commission on 31 March 1915 and its 
expiration on 20 August 1920 the DRLC received 5, 979 applications for 
compensation. These applications were separated into two groups; one-time 
aud annual claims, with 63. 1 percent of the annual claims and 57. 4 percent of 
the one-time claims paid in full amount by the government, a sum for both 
categories totaling f4, 855, 083. Claims in both groups seeking a total of 
X3, 427, 961 were rejected, a ilgure representing a savings for the government. 
Property requisitioning provided the state with a powerful tool with 
which to enact policies for the conduct of the war. Such a power, though, did 
not belong in the tradition for property rights that Great Britain possessed. 
Despite a number of policies adopted that were designed to address the 
problems that property requisitioniug created, cases were fded that challenged 
the very foundation of tbe power of the Defence of the Realm Act. It was only 
the state's ability to postpone consideration of such cases until the end of the 
War that preserved property requisitioning as a tool of government policy. How 
this tool, along with the other powers granted under the Act, were used in 
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attaining speci6c goals, will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REGULATION 
The First World War meant a new level of warfare to the British people. 
The wars of the previous century were limited struggles that occured in colonies 
an ocean away and made for entertaining reading in the back pages of the 
penny press. Even Napoleon's attempt to bring the island to its knees a century 
before through the Continental @stem left a negligible impact on the everyday 
lives of the average citizenry, As a result, the struggle and sacri6ce involved in 
major wars was an abstract concept for the British nation. 
This changed with the onset of war in August 1914. Though the British 
people did not know it at the time, they had embarked on a new type of 
conflict — the total war. Technology allowed the nations to replenish their 
supplies of materiel at a much higher rate than ever before in the history of 
warfare. Warfare changed from battles between small opposing armies to 
massive conflicts of attrition that tested the limits of the national will. As the 
British government slowly came to realize, such a war required the mobilization 
of every citizen to the goal of victory over the Central Powers. 
In a nation whose industrial economy was built on the doctrine of laissez- 
faire, this involved the unprecedented expansion of the power of the state, and 
the Defence of the Realm Acts were at the forefront of this growth. The 
government used the authority of DORA to control food production, manage 
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industrial activities, and regulate labor. Yet the government's ministers soon 
realized that the level of mobilization this new type of war demanded meant 
that not just the economy, but society itself needed to be managed in order to 
achieve the maximum level of economic efficiency. Additional regulations were 
promulgated that touched the everyday lives of British citizens, and any story of 
DORA's role in governing the war economy must include these measures as 
well. 
The use of the Act to regulate the economy was a slow process brought 
about by the exigencies of war. Nowhere is this better seen than in the 
government's handling of foodstuffs. Prior to the start of the war the British 
diet relied on imports for most of its needs, with basic staples such as wheat and 
sugar almost completely supplied by foreign sources. Domestic agriculture was 
primarily oriented towards the breeding of livestock, and was unsuited to 
supplying the dietary needs of the nation. When the War began the 
government maintained a laissez-faire policy, intervening only when necessary, 
as was the case with the takeover of the sugar trade in August 1914. Such a 
policy was more the result of practical considerations than adherence to any 
philosophical doctrine. Bumper crops in the Americas and the ability of the 
Royal Navy to defend the trade routes made a more interventionist stance 
unnecessary, t 
& P. E. Dewey, British Agriculture in the First World War (New York: 
Routledge, 1989), ch. 3. 
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This situation changed in the latter half of 1916. The increasing threat 
posed by German submarines to British shipping and the failure of the North 
American wheat harvest, as well as a number of minor factors, increased the 
need for greater domestic production. As a result, the formation of the Lloyd 
George coalition in December 1916 saw a new "plough policy" authored by the 
new President of the Board of Agriculture, R. E. Prothero. Prothero's policy 
entailed the use of compulsory powers to increase food production, and DORA 
supplied many of these powers. Some of the agricultural regulations were an 
offshoot of the measures dealing with property rights. Regulation 2L, created 
in response to increased demand for land resulting from a combination of crop 
failures, high prices, and the occupation of all of the readily procurable 
allotments, allowed government officials to seize land "with a view to 
maintaining the food supply of the county. " Regulation 2M extended the 
state's power to land already under cultivation by giving it the ability to inspect 
land, thus ensuring that agricultural decrees were being obeyed, and to take 
over the farms if they were not. To these regulations the government added 
new, more speci6c measures. Regulation 2NN restricted acreage planted with 
hops in an attempt to promote the cultivation of grains, while keeping pigs was 
encouraged by Regulation 20. Farmers were even prevented from selling any 
horses "used or capable of being used" for cultivating holdings without a permit 
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under Regulation 2T. ~ 
The regulations enacted under DORA formed the cornerstone of British 
wartime agricultural measures. The food campaigns of both 1917 and 1918 
were conducted under the aegis of DORA while the government's planned 
legislative basis, the Corn Production Act of 1917, became a lightning rod for 
conservative criticism, The most contentious aspect of the bill was Part IV, 
which granted the Board of Agriculture the right to determine how land should 
be used as well as the power to break leases and evict tenants unwilling to 
follow its directives. Conservatives in both Houses of Parliament decried this 
assault on property rights, despite the fact that similar measures were already in 
place as DOR regulations, Lord Desborough claimed that the act was "the 
most monstrous propos@ I have seen in any Bill that has ever been introduced 
into Parliament, "' In the end, the government relented to these demands and 
gave landowners the right of appeal of dispossession and cropping orders to an 
independent arbitrator. Lloyd George's ministers, however, got around the 
measure by suspending Part IV for a year and relying on DORA's Regulation 
2M, where no such right existed. 4 
t Pulling, DORA Manual, p. 52-64; T, H. Middleton, Food Production in 
War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 163, 167. 
' H. L. Debs, 5th ser. , vol. XXVI (1917), col. 323. 
' L. Margaret Barnett, British Food Policy During the First World War 
(Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 197; Middleton, Food Production in 
War, pp. 271-7; Dewey, British Agriculture in the First World War, pp, 92, 95. 
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Despite the protests of many that state control of agricultural production 
went too far in eroding the rights of the people, it became apparent that in fact 
the government did not go far enough in regulating this sector of the economy. 
The distribution and sale of food also became subject to state control under 
DORA during the first few weeks of the Lloyd George government. With the 
exception of the aforementioned takeover of the sugar trade and such minor 
measures as the use of the Act to requisition insulated space aboard cargo ships 
returning from Australia, New Zealand, and South America (thus ensuring the 
transport of beef purchased at low rates abroad), overt intervention was 
nonexistent as the government maintained a policy of "business as usual. " 
Initially the state attempted to stem fluctuations in price through 
"recommendations" as to the maximum retail prices of foodstuffs, though as the 
war went on this approach was increasingly futile. In June, 1916, a Food Prices 
Committee was appointed at the Board of Trade to examine the reasons for 
rising prices and to recommend possible solutions. The first two of three 
interim reports, issued in September and November respectively, proposed state 
control of prices on meat, milk, and grains. On November 15, the same day as 
the issuance of the second report, the President of the Board of Trade, Walter 
Runciman, announced the creation of the position of Food Controller (at the 
head of a new Mnistry of Food created on December 20) to administer new 
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food regulations issued under DORA. ' 
These regulations gave the state widespread control over food supply. 
Regulation 2B granted the broad powers "to take the possession of any war 
material, food, forage and stores of any description, " while Regulation 2E 
included the ability to regulate dealings with these products. Other regulations 
spelled out specific powers of the new Food Controller; Regulation 2F of 
DORA gave him the broad authority to issue orders "for the purpose of 
encouraging or maintaining the food supply of the country, " whfie other 
regulations gave powers to demand returns, seize farms, conduct inquiries, and 
coordinate food policy with other departments and local authorities. While 
some of these powers represented a further extension of DORA's authority over 
property rights, most signalled a new expansion of state control into areas 
traditionally left unmolested, ' 
The Lloyd George government made full use of the new powers in 
directing agriculture and food policy. Under Regulation 2L, 19, 182 acres were 
seized for cultivation in 1917, with another 8, 500 acres added in 1918. ' This 
land helped arrest declining agricultural output; whereas during the first two 
years of the war agricultural output dropped by 2 percent below prewar levels, 
s William Beveridge, British Food Control (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1928), pp. 11, 19-24, 
' Pulling, DORA Manual, pp. 42-6. 
' Middleton, Food Production in IVar, pp. 195, 230. 
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the output of cereals and potatoes rose by 57 percent between 1917 and the 
Armistice. s Such growth helped address nutritional needs for the remainder of 
the war. Caloric consumption suffered only a slight decline, and this in spite of 
the diversion of foodstuffs to the soldiers. Severe food shortages were avoided 
through a combination of rationing and food economy, or getting more nutrition 
out of the same amount of food. This success was achieved in no small part 
through of the powers granted under the Act. 
DORA regulations regarding property rights also played a critical role in 
industrial regulation. The Act's role in managing the industrial sector was far 
less prominent than it was in other areas, as the government relied upon 
separate legislation and other forms of agreements. These laws and the 
bureaucracies which they created, however, owed their existence in part to the 
ground-breaking presence of DORA. Moreover, many of the powers that these 
new ministries had came from DOR regulations, the result of a need for powers 
that the initial acts did not contain. One area where this can be seen is in the 
munitions industty. Here the Act was used in conjunction with other 
legislation; in this case, the Munitions of War Act which established the 
Ministry of Munitions in 1915. The Defense of the Realm Act granted to the 
Minister of Munitions the power to, among other things, requisition the output 
of explosives factories (Regulation 7), vary terms of sub-contracts (Regulation 
s Dewey, British Agriculture in the First World Wttr, p. 218. 
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2BB), and even (as will be seen below) monitoring the health and safety 
conditions of the workplace (Regulations 35A and 35AA). ' 
Another area which came under the control of the Act was shipping. As 
noted earlier, shipping regulation helped regulate the flow of material within 
the economy, By controlling shipping, the state had far greater control over the 
availability of raw materials, as well as the ability to halt the export of vital 
goods. A number of regulations made such control possible. In addition to the 
regulations concerning property control, Regulation 39BBB gave power to the 
Shipping Controller to organize docks and shipyards, while Regulation 39C 
incrased the Shipping Controller's powers to prevent congestion of traf6c, 
Additional regulations were also enacted to increase safety. Regulations 36, 
36A, and 37 enforced compliance with navagation rules, while 37A and 37B 
mandated radios and other signalling devices be installed on board ships of 500 
tons or above. Such coordination and control eased many of Britain's shipping 
problems, untangling a complex knot created by the conflict. '0 
But nowhere was DORA's power in the industrial sector more apparent 
than in the assumption of state control. Here the Act allowed the state to take 
s Not all of the regulations dealing with the armaments industry granted 
authority to the Ministry of Munitions — Regulation 6B, for example, gave the 
power of licensing explosives factories to the Secretary of State for War. 
Pulling, DORA Manua/, pp. 43, 67-9, 126-7. 
" Pulling, DORA Manual, pp. 129-41; C. Ernest Fayle, The War and the 
Shipping Industry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), ch. 13. 
over and direct industry in the iaterests of the war effort, a power that during 
the initial stages of the War was restricted to assuming control of the railways. 
As the War progressed the need for direct control grew, and tbe government 
again turned to DORA as the means for assuming such control. This is most 
clearly visible in the coal industry. At tbe start of the War the coal industry 
remaiaed largely untouched by state regulation. Tbe initial demaads of the war 
soon put an end to such freedom, however, and the government began to pass 
Orders-in-Council regulating the distribution of coal, while the Price of Coal 
(Limitation) Act set limits on margins of profit on coal. Yet by 1916, the 
government was compelled to extend their influence still further by assuming 
control of the entire industry. » 
The immediate antecedents of the takeover of the coal industry lay in a 
labor dispute in the South Wales coal fields. Under a Conciliation Board 
Agreement, the wages of miners came under review every three months, with 
both the mine owners and the workers submitting claims for wage levels. 
Throughout 1916, tbe Conciliatioa Board preferred to keep wages at a fixed 
level, and the only increase that came about prior to the November review 
occurred in May and then only after government intervention brought about by 
a threat by the South Wales Miners' Federation to strike. During the 
R. A. S. Redmayae, The British Coal-Mining Industry during the War 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 12-87; Barry Supple, The History of the 
British Coal Industry, vol. 4, 1913-1946:??te Political Economy of Decline 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp, 45-57. 
November review, however, the miners coupled their demands for a 15 per cent 
pay increase with a joint audit of the owners' ledgers. After the board rejected 
their demands the miners went directly to the government and threatened once 
more to strike if their demands were not met, Negotiations between the sides 
went nowhere, and on 24 November the miners renewed their threat to strike 
by the end of the month. » 
The impending threat of a strike shutting down an important source of 
fuel for the Royal Navy and the merchant marine posed a direct challenge to 
the war effort. After the failure of additional negotiations the government 
issued Regulation 9G under the provisions of DORA on 29 November 
establishing direct state control over the South Wales coal 6elds. » Initially, the 
move encountered opposition from an unexpected quarter — the miners 
themselves, who thought that the move needed to be on a nationwide scale. 
Their complaints subsided, however, once the newly-established Lloyd George 
government promised that the takeover of the South Wales 6elds was only the 
6rst step. On 22 February 1917 a new order was issued placing all coal 6elds 
under government jurisdiction, to be run by a Coal Controller at the newly- 
» G. D. H. Cole, Labour in the Coal Mining Industry (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 38-47, 
" Pulling, DORA Manual, p. 84. 
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created Mines Department. '4 
While the state now ostensibly controlled tbe nation's coal mines, this 
was not nationalization. Rather, it was the government heading off a potentially 
disruptive labor dispute that threatened the supply of a material vital to the war 
effort. This was a justification for state intervention unique during the war, as 
"labor unrest, rather than the direct problem of supply, was tbe root cause of 
intervention. "«Because of this, state control changed things very little. The 
government left the operation of the mines in the hands of the mine ownets, 
and in practice, "[s]tate 'control' of the mines was, in rely, but a glorified 
Excess Profits Duty, with a guaranteed profit. "«Direct intervention was 
exceedingly rare for the remainder of the war, and when such intervention did 
occur, it was done to maintain the coal supply and the status quo within the 
industry. » 
Though the state possessed a mighty tool to deal with labor unrest in its 
ability to assume control of entire industries, it was not the only one the Act 
supplied in order to ensure production of wartime goods. A number of 
«Cole, Labour in the Coal Mining Industry, pp. 46-7; Redmayne, ?yte 
British Coal-Mining Industry during the War, pp. 88-92, 
Supple, ?7te History of the British Coal Mining Industry, p. 76. 
«Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great Britain, p. 179. 
» Redmayne, ??te British Coal-Mining Industry during the War, pp. 199- 
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regulations dealt with labor issues aud the disruptions such actions caused, such 
as provisions that restricted employees' right to action. Though the unions 
made an open promise in 1915 not to strike for the duration of the war, as was 
seen earlier strikes were threatened and carried out throughout the war, most 
prominently in the coal industry, Such strikes usually lasted for only a few days, 
and while not formally banned under DORA or other British wartime 
legislation, their action was restricted and the government utilized DORA and 
other statutes to limit both the duration and the impact of these strikes, " 
One example of wartime striking was the strike at the Parkhead Forge 
works of Wiiham Beardmore & Co. , Ltd. in March 1916. The strike resulted 
from the owners' refusal to allow David Kirkwood, convenor of shop stewards 
and one of the leaders of the Clyde Workers' Committee (CWC), freedom of 
movement throughout the works. The government soon intervened directly, 
using the provisions of DORA to deport Kirkwood and other CWC leaders 
from the region as well as threatening prosecutions under both the Munitions 
Act and DORA. The local engineering employers, the North-West Engineering 
Trades Employers' Association, fully supported the action and pressed the 
government to "put the fullest powers of the Defence of the Realm Act into 
operation against ringleaders. "» Such a statement is significant in showing the 
Rossiter, Constitutiona! Dictatorship, pp. 168-9. 
» North-West Engineering Trades Employers' Association (NWETEA), 
hfinute Book, No. 7, 23 March 1916. Quoted in G. R. Rubin, War, Law, and 
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shift in responsibility for dealing with a strike, for it focused on "the steps which 
the Government, rather than the employers themselves, ought to take to meet 
the threat posed by militants. "~ 
There were also measures that imposed health and safety rules upon 
factories handling explosives. Regulation 35A granted the power to make safety 
rules for the manufacture and storage of explosives. Regulation 35AA went one 
step further, granting similar rule-making authority to the government "with a 
view to securing the health of all or any of the persons" involved in tbe process 
of manufacturing or storing explosives. By addressing such issues, the 
government played a greater role in addressing the concerns of workers while 
ensuring a reasonably safe working environment. These regulations, by 
establishing government oversight of working conditions, had an additional long- 
term impact by helping to set the stage for postwar monitoring of the workplace 
by the state. » 
Regulations could only do so much in the workplace, however. While 
the government sought through DORA to exact every bit of productivity from 
workers, many oflicials knew that a myriad number of factors determined 
output and that many of those factors existed outside the factory gates. To 
Labour (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 97. 
G. R. Rubin, War Law, and Labour, p. 97, 
" Pulling, DORA Manual, p. 126-7. 
address these factors the government turned once more to DORA. One 
example of this was when the government used the Act to secure suitable 
lodgings for the tens of thousands of workers employed in the rapidly expanding 
war industries, Regulation 2(a) gave the state (usually in the form of the 
Ministry of Munitions) the power "to take possemon of any unoccupied 
premises" for the housing of workers. ~ This power, which was an extension of 
the property seizure aspect of DORA discussed in the previous chapter, was 
used in one instance to seize hundreds of houses in Kent, Once they were 
converted into hostels, they provided lodging for hundreds of employees 
working for the Vickers armaments plant there. 23 
Such regulations had a direct application to workers, Others were not as 
obvious, however. Increasingly the government saw a need to control an 
increasing part of everyday life in Great Britain. This social regulation was by 
far the most visible impact of DORA upon the populace, as it served to bring 
home both the new expanded role of government and the sacri6ces that needed 
to be made for the conduct of war by disrupting the everyday patterns of 
Edwardian living. Virtually no part of life was left unregulated by the Act, 
Under DORA, races, fairs and even dog shows were banned; public and 
banking holidays were regulated, railway excursion traf6c was restricted. The 
~ Ibid, p, 41. 
23 Angela Woollacott, On Her Zheir Lives Depend (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994), pp. 51-2. 
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distribution of drugs was variously restricted and relaxed; the sale of cocaine 
and opium was limited, while Local Governing Boards were given powers to 
authorize the distribution of venereal disease remedies. ~ 
But no area of British life was as completely changed by DORA as was 
the consumption of liquor. Here the Act dealt with an issue prominent in 
British politics for a number of years prior to the war. While many involved in 
the temperance and prohibition efforts prior to the war saw the conflict as an 
opportunity to carry out social experimentation, it was the demands of the 
conflict which increased the powers of the state in dealing with alcohol. This 
was addressed in two ways, one of which was through regulations. Initially, this 
was done through Orders-in-Council, which allowed authorities to close pubs 
and restrict "treating", or the practice of buying drinks for others. While both of 
these may seem extreme at Srst glance, these rules reflected the experiences of 
the Boer War, "when disgraceful scenes occurred on the embarkation of troops 
at certain ports where laxity prevailed. '~ Later, these orders were made into 
formal regulations. Pubs in military areas were covered under Regulation 10, 
which granted of6cials the power to close premises licensed to sell alcohol and 
to "make such provisions. . . for the prevention of the practice of treating. " 
Regulation 40 covered the sale of intoxicants to members of the armed services 
~ Pulling, DORA Manual, pp. 79-83, 142-5. 
& Arthur Shadwell, Dnnk in 1914-1922 (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co. , 1923), pp. 1-3. 
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who were on duty or to those who were off duty "with the intent of eliciting 
information [or] to make him drunk. " Such regulations allowed the government 
to restrict servicemen's access to alcohol, thus addressing the problems posed in 
earlier wars. ~ 
Though regulations provided a powerful tool in dealing with soldiers' 
access to alcohol, a more flexible approach was required in terms of managing 
alcohol in the civilian sector. As the war lasted longer than the short, limited 
confhct Britons expected, oflicials began to concern themselves with questions 
of industrial ef6ciency. Alcohol came to be seen as au impediment to achieving 
such ef6ciency and government oflicials sought ways of dealing with it, There 
were few outside the temperance movement who thought that it would be 
possible to ban all alcohol for the duration of the war, but without an outright 
ban flexibility was needed in order to address separate and differing 
circumstances. Initial plans to regulate through taxation were abandoned in 
favor of a Defence of the Realm (Amendment) bill which passed into law on 19 
May 1915. This concentrated control of the liquor trade in the hands of the 
central government while giving them greater powers to handle matters. » 
To handle these newly created powers, an Order-in-Council was issued 
on 10 June 1915 which established a Central Control Board to regulate the sale 
~ Pulling, DORA hfanua/, pp. 87-8, 141-2. 
27 Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, ch. 2. 
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and use of alcohol. Though given great authority, the Board could not act of its 
own volition. To act it required a formal request from the local authorities. In 
military areas, the request was usually made by the relevant service, either the 
Admiralty or the army. But the Board was also called in to control the liquor 
trade in industrial areas as well, and such requests came from the Ministty of 
Munitions. Having received such a request, the Board conducted local inquiries 
in order to ascertain the particular circumstances of the region. Once the 
situation was determined the regulations were issued. The Board passed 
decrees which dictated the hours in which pubs could operate; henceforth, the 
sale of liquor was permitted only for two and a half hours in the afternoon and 
only another three hours in the evening. In addition, home drinking was 
discouraged through limitations on alcohol sales and such practices as treating, 
buying liquor on credit, and other minor restrictions were made to crack down 
on evaders. By the end of 1915 over half of the population of Great Britain 
came under the Board's regulations, and by the Armistice only a few 
agricultural areas were left unmanaged. For a brief period of time the 
government even flirted with state ownership of the liquor trade, but despite 
controlling the drink trade in the Carlisle region from 1916 until well after the 
end of the war, little else came about as a result of the proposal. nt 
~ Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, chs. 3, 5, & 6; Michael E. Rose, 'The 
Success of Social Reform? The Central Control Board (Liquor Traflic) 1915- 
21, " in 8'ar and Society, ed. M. R. D. Foot (London: Paul Elek, 1973), pp. 71- 
84; John Turner, "State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World War, " 
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Needless to say, such actions harcHy endeared the cause of war to the 
populace. Some workers felt that some aspects of liquor regulation went too 
far, as can be seen in the memoirs of one laborer, who was particularly irritated 
by the prohibition of treating: 
Yes, no treating. You couldn't go into a public house, two on you and 
say, 'give us two pints o' beer and I' ll pay for them. ' That was against 
the law. The pubs got restricted, and it got so they didn't have the beer. 
Sometimes they weren't open above two days a week because they never 
had the beer. It was more or less rationed to them. . . Some of them 
boys came home here [to Bungay] on leave and would go into a pub. 
There was a notice up: Regular Customers Only, and only one pint! Yes, 
here were terrible rows down there. Chaps smashed windows because 
the landlord wouldn't serve them. . . Before the war some of the pubs 
would be open all night nearly. Open again at six in the morning. I' ve 
been down there [The Crown in Carlton] at 6. 30 in the morning and 
seven or eight of 'em have been drunk as lords, There was more beer 
spilled on the floor than is drunk now. » 
Despite such grumbling, however, most people supported the need to regulate 
drink in order to win the war, and measures such as Regulation 10 did decrease 
the incidence of drunkenness in the nation. Police reports showed a drop in the 
incidence of drunkenness, and workplaces noted that the regulations "effected a 
decided improvement" in worker ef6ciency. Employees were more punctual and 
"turn[ed] up more lit for work" than they did before the imposition of control. 
Some publicans even stated that "the curtailment of hours was a great boon to 
them;" for some, the prewar hours were far too long, while most thought their 
77te Historical Journal 23:3 (1980), pp. 589-615. 
» George Ewart Evans, 77te Days 7hat 8'e Have Seen (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1975), pp. 140-1, 
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customers more manageable and well-behaved. ~ 
Throughout the First World War, tbe British government turned to the 
Defense of the Realm Acts to carry out many of their agricultural and industrial 
policies. As with other areas, the eventual powers granted by the Act to the 
state were far greater than were planned during the initial stages of the war. 
This expansion was propelled by the needs created by the war; the needs to 
feed a nation, to arm its armies and tbe armies and its allies, and power its 
industries. The government even found it necessary to use the Act as a tool of 
social regulation, to ensure healthy and alert workers and soldiers for the effort 
against Germany. What is most remarkable about this is not so much that 
DORA was used so extensively, but that it occurred with hardly a murmur of 
protest. Even traditional opponents to the expansion of the power of the state 
grudgingly accepted it without so much as a question raised in Parliament. Such 
was not the case with other applications of the Act, particularly when it was 
used to suppress civil liberties. It is to this application that we will now turn to. 
~ Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, ch, 8. 
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CHAFIER IV 
DORA AND THE RESTRICTION OF LIBERTIES 
To this point, most of the examination of the Defence of the Realm Acts 
has $ocused largely on the use of the Acts to broaden powers of the state in 
facilitating the conduct of the War. This has meant focusing on the regulations 
and powers in the economic and social spheres, which allowed the state 
sweeping control over the country. DORA served other purposes that required 
powers that might be better seen as those of the scalpel rather than those of the 
scythe, This chapter examines those powers which focus on the control of 
individuals and their effect on the War. These powers covered a number of 
areas dealing with what are known as civil liberties — freedom of the press, of 
assembly, even of movement within the country. Though these liberties may be 
less paramount in tbe British constitutional tradition, they were still important 
to British citizens, and the powers granted under the Act were no less restrictive 
to these freedoms as a result. 
No freedom received greater restrictions than that of tbe press. As 
noted above, censorship of the press was a subject that concerned British 
authorities before 1914, and because of this previous concern, DORA was not 
the only statutory tool the government had to enforce censorship. The Of6cial 
Secrets Act of 1911 covered defense information deemed sensitive, allowing for 
restriction of critical facts which might otherwise jeopardize government activity 
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if they were known. In addition, upon taking of6ce as Secretary of State for 
War lord Kitchener declared martial law at the front lines and banned 
correspondents from the combat zone, thus further cutting off the flow of 
information to the media. When Gve correspondents were permitted in May 
1915 to report on the British armies in France, the headquarters staff of the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) censored all outgoing copy to ensure that 
military secrets were not divulged. These measures, however, only controlled 
classi6ed information and operational details, leaving domestic coverage and 
conunentary on the war to be dedt with in other ways, 
Domestic censorship was for the most part an informal matter. On 27 
July 1914, the Joint Committee established under the agreement between the 
Services and the press of 1912~ requested a ban on reporting the movements of 
the BEF, one which lasted until the army was fully deployed in France. While 
the ban was observed, the lack of "hard news" produced "a spate of wild rumors 
and exaggerated reports'~ that was almost as detrimental to the country as full 
disclosure might have been. As a result, at the instigation of Winston Churchill, 
the Cabinet established a Press Bureau on 7 August. Headed by F. E. Smith, 
the purpose of the board was to "provide a steady stream of trustworthy 
See ch. I. 
s Lovelace, "British Press Censorship, " p. 310. 
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information supplied by both the War Office and the Admiralty. '" The Bureau 
also screened outgoing and incoming cables and telegrams for every newspaper 
in the country. Any additional material was to be submitted on a voluntary 
basis, and the Bureau issued 'Y)" notices to advise tbe media on how the news 
should be treated. 
Though this voluntary system proved effective for the most part, there 
were a number of instances during the war when the press overstepped their 
bounds, forcing the government to resort to more formal methods of censorship. 
To this end they turned to the powers granted under the various DORA, and 
ultimately three regulations were drawn up to deal with censorship, Of the 
three regulatioas, Number 18 was the most important as it prohibited the 
gathering and sendiag of information on Service matters. Two sub-regulations 
(18A and 18B) extended this power further by outlawing communications with 
spies and restricting the publishiag of information oa patents and other 
inventions, 4 Taken as a whole, Regulation 18 "covered most aspects of the 
work done by the official Press Bureau and gave such 'voluntary' censorship the 
support of statutory compulsion, '" 
The other two regulations focused upon domestic matters and 
' H. C. Debs, 5th ser. , vol. LXXI (1914), cols. 2153-6. 
4 Pulling, DORA Manual, pp. 101-3. 
' Deian Hopkin, "Domestic Censorship in tbe First World War, " Journal 
of Contemporary History, vol. 5 (1970), p. 157. 
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enforcement. Regulation 27 dealt with non-military information, banning the 
spread of "false or prejudicial reports" by in speech or in print. The prohibition 
of the spread of reports of secret meetings of Parliament or the Cabinet was 
covered under Regulation 27A, while 27AA extended this restriction to 
coverage of the Irish Convention assembled to establish a new constitutional 
framework for Ireland. The last two subsets of Regulation 27, 27B and 27C, 
extended censorship of Regulation 27 to imported publications and published 
leafiets respectively. These regulations were of more use in dealing with 
opinions which might cause "disaffection, " giving the government a tool to use 
against people protesting the war. Finally, Regulation 51 gave the authorities 
the power to search premises and seize anything found that was "being kept or 
used in contravention of [DORA] regulations, " with the seizure of documents 
authorized under Regulation 51A, ' 
Yet despite the availability to the authorities of these wide ranging 
powers, the general consensus of both contemporaries and historians is that the 
government used them sparingly. While the regulations ensured for the most 
part that confidential information was not published, this was more the result 
self-censorship by the media and the efforts of the Press Bureau, with the Act 
only providing the coercive muscle in the rare instances when cooperation was 
not forthcoming. In this sense, the threat of the use of the regulations was 
6 Ibid, pp. 113-5, 164-7. 
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effective enough to encourage sufficient compliance with the government's 
goals. Suppressing dissenting opinions, on the other hand, was a different 
matter for a number of reasons. First, such censorship was usually retroactive, 
as the Press Bureau had its hands full monitoring straight news stories, thus 
giving journalists greater independence. These people faced a dilemma as 
issues of free expression of ideas in a democratic society (and the corrections 
that such expressions could effect) clashed with the amorphous goal of keeping 
up morale during wartime There were issues of image as well; a rigorous 
censorship policy would generate damaging propaganda abroad, especially in the 
United States, a country Britain needed as an ally. Finally, there were domestic 
political factors to consider, as each side had its share of detractors and 
supporters. This is best illustrated by the relaxation for political reasons of 
restrictions on the left-wing "pacifist" publications by Lloyd George upon his 
accession to the premiership in 1916. ' 
Perhaps the best example of all these issues can be seen with the conduct 
of the weekly magazine New Statesman during the war. The publication, 
founded by Sidney and Beatrice Webb along with George Bernard Shaw as "A 
Weekly Review of Politics and Literature, " was a newcomer on the British 
publishing scene, with the first number issued on 12 April 1913. Though 
cooperative for most of the war, the magazine did challenge the government on 
7 Lovelace, "British Press Censorship, " p. 313. 
a number of points, including the control of information and the censorship of 
pacifist publications. This defense of pacifist publications is particularly 
reveahng in terms of how the press viewed the Act; the editor of the ¹w 
Statesman, Clifford Sharp wrote of his fears that DORA would most seriously 
effect those publications "with no special Cabinet friends. "8 
Such a challenge involved treading a very fine line, and the ¹w 
Statesman periodically found it teetering over the wrong side from time to time. 
During the leadership crisis in December 1916, Sharp wrote an article which 
described Lloyd George as a man with disputable capabilities as a leader whose 
moral bankruptcy deprived him of any standing as a leader. ' In the end, 
however, tbe magazine's publisher R. B. Byles insisted on removing the 
paragraphs, and an explanation was added stating "we consider itundesirable in 
the national interest that tbe matters dealt with in the latter part of this article 
be publicly discussed. "" The omission probably saved the magazine from 
closure under DORA, as well as rescued Sharp from a libel suit and almost 
certain loss of tbe exemption that was preserving him from service in the front 
lines, The Act also limited the magazine's ability to defend pacifist newspapers, 
as a German radio broadcast's mention (inaccurate, as it turned out) of one 
' ''Ihe new press law. " New Statesman, 29 April 1916. 
9 Quoted in Adrian Smith, 7he New Statesman; Portrait of a Political 
Weekly, 1913-1931 (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 102-3. 
w "Had Zimri Peace?" New Statesman, 9 December, 1916. 
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paper's call for civil disobedience to conscription prompted a government order 
in January 1917 banning any mention of paci6st newspapers under penalty of 
DORA prosecution. » 
Though such instances illustrate the primary role of the Act as a 
deterrence, this is not to say that its powers of censorship were never used. 
One of the most prominent cases of its application was the prosecution of the 
Globe in November 1915. The incident was triggered by the paper's report on 5 
November of the imminent resignation of Lord Kitchener from his position in 
the Cabinet as Secretary of State for War. The Globe's previous attacks, 
particularly its assault on Prince Louis of Battenburg during his tenure as First 
Sea Lord of the Admiralty at the start of the War, threatened tbe delicate 
stability of the government. The article on Kitchener provided Asquith's 
government with the opportunity to discipline the paper. On Saturday, 6 
November, the police raided the of6ces of the Globe, con6scating both the 
Friday and Saturday editions (the evening edition about to be published) for 
violations of Regulation 27. The police also acted under Regulation 51 and 
seized the presses themselves, removing the printing plates and other vital parts 
of the mechanism. » 
» Adrian Smith, "Censorship and the Great War: The First Test of New 
Statesmanship. " In Writing and Censorship in Britain, Paul Hyland and Neil 
Sammells, eds. ]London: Routledge, 1992), p. 185-99. 
» 7he Times, 8 November 1915, p, 10b. 
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The suspension of the Globe elicited a storm of controversy in 
Parliament. Though receiving broad support in the House of Commons when it 
convened on 9 November, tbe government faced stiff questioning from a 
number of Liberal MPs. One member challenged Prime Minister Asquith as to 
why proceedings weren't taken "in the ordinary way, " while another charged that 
tbe government went after tbe Globe while letting another London newspaper 
publish a similar article without comment. Asquith and the Home Secretaxy, Sir 
John Simon, were both forced to issue statements two days later addressing 
these complaints and justifying their actions to the public, facing another round 
of questions afterward. & 
The suspension of the Globe was perhaps the most public and 
controversial act of censorship taken under DORA, but it was by no means the 
most important one. Perhaps the most revealing case of censorship under the 
Act was that of Penner Brockway. Brockway must have been a tempting target 
to those in government wbo used the Acts to deal with dissent. Born in India 
to a family of English missionaries in 1888, be was raised in Britain from the 
age of 4. He initially supported the Liberal Party but soon became a committed 
socialist member of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and worked first as a 
journalist, then as editor of a weekly newspaper called the Labour Leader. The 
Labour Leader bad served as the official organ of the ILP ever since the 
» H. C. Debs, 5th ser. , vol. LXXV, cols. 1023-5. 
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organization purchased it from Keir Hardie in 1903. Despite its status, the 
paper ran at an annual loss of g1, 000 and "was saved from probable extinction 
by the Qrst world war. "'4 Under Brockway's leadership, the Labour Leader came 
out in opposition to the conflict aud quicldy established itself as a center of 
protest against the War, with intellectuals such as Lowes Dickinson, Vernon 
Lee, and Gilbert Canaan contributing articles and stories. 
Such writings also brought the paper and its editor to the attention of the 
government Although Brockway later wrote that, "[w]e had surprisingly little 
interference from the government, "u much of this was the result of careful self- 
censorship. Writings against the war were published in the pages of the Labour 
Leader only when there was a sound legal defense of the work. When the 
police raided the paper's of6ces because of an article by Isabel Sloan about 
dying soldiers, the Labour Leader successfully defended itself against the Public 
Prosecutor's action and had the seized copies of the paper returned, Only once 
was the paper success6dly censored by the state, with the editorial staff 
submitting to police demands as a plan to increase circulation rather than out of 
an unintentional inclusion of objectionable material. '6 
Far more problematical, however, was the play The Devil's Business. The 
u Fenner Brockway, Towards Tomorrow (London: Hart-Davis, 
MacGibbon, 1977), chs. 1-4. 
» Ibid, p. 39 
« Ibid, p. 38-9. 
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work was originally written by Brockway in February 1914 for publication in the 
Labour Leader. The "crowded state of its columns, " though, delayed publication 
until after the outbreak of the war, when the reduced size of the Labour Leader 
and the domestic climate made its publication there unlikely. Brockway felt it 
was more relevant than ever, however, aud decided to publish it in booklet 
form. The original references to war between Britain and Germany were 
removed, and Brockway made additional changes in the hope of avoiding 
censorship, The play was published at the end of 1914, with a "Justification" 
published as an introduction which outlined the "armaments ring" that Brockway 
saw as setting the conditions for the war. » 
The play is set in a meeting of a 'War Committee" consisting of the 
Prime Minister, the War Minister, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, all 
thinly-veiledcaricatures of the actual occupants of the office. The nation is at 
war with another "civilised and Christian Power" and the three are debating war 
strategy when word comes that the fleet was destroyed by "new type fire-cloud 
bombs" dropped from enemy planes, Horror strikes the trio as they realize that 
the weapons used to destroy the fleet are the same as those which were offered 
to the government by "the Armaments Trust" some time earlier, only to be 
turned down and offered to the enemy instead. At that moment a 
representative of the Armaments Trust arrives, shocking the Prime Minister and 
» Fenner Brockway, 7he Devil's Business (London: I. L. P. Publication 
Department, 1926; Reprint of 1914 edition), p. 5. 
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the War Minister by being a woman, ber words and mannerisms taunting the 
two and amusing the younger and more free-thinking First Lord. Not only does 
she freely acknowledges that her Trust sold the weapons to the enemy (pointing 
out that the War Minister is one of its biggest shareholders) but she is there to 
offer "aero-bombs" to destroy the enemy's approaching air fleet. Her asking 
price of one hundred million pounds outrages the three ministers, yet they have 
no other choice but to agree to her terms, As she is about to leave, sbe 
mentions that she also has plans for a long range gun capable of bombarding 
the city from the front lines, and that she is also willing to sell these plans to 
the government for an additional one hundred million pounds. Despite the 
pleas of the Prime Minister of the already dramaticaHy high costs of the war, 
she refuses to lower her price. 
Just then a mob arrives outside the building, having heard of the naval 
defeat. The Prime Minister is forced to accept her offer under the threat of 
having the gun sold to the enemy and goes outside to calm tbe crowd. His 
words prove fruitless, and he is struck down by a stone thrown at his bead, The 
First Lord delivers a stirring speech appealing to their patriotism and promising 
that tbe defeat 'will be forgotten in the triumph we shall achieve. " As the crowd 
begins to disperse, the War Minister orders his hastily assembled men to Sre a 
volley over the crowd as a warning, an act which angers the Prime Minister. As 
the deal is signed, the representative from the Armaments Trust, now rather 
hesitant, begins to present another invention to the committee. This causes the 
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Prime Minister to explode with anger, ordering her to take the weapons back 
"to the devil in whose business you are engaged, " and announcing that he would 
rather surrender to the enemy "than to the soulless traders in death that you 
represent. " The outburst draws the Trust representative to the Prime Minister 
but he is drained by his tirade and collapses. Dying, he apologizes for his 
outburst, blaming himself for the conflict and asking the First Lord to order the 
Foreign Secretary to negotiate a peace. He dies, surrounded by a sorrowlul 
First Lord and the Trust Representative, with the War Minister further off 
saying, Thank God! Now we can get on with the war. "" 
Though Brockway had hoped to avoid difficulties with the work (while 
still retaining his basic message that the armaments industries were the true 
villains of the War), copies of the play were seized under Regulation 27 of 
DORA in police raids of Independent Labour Party (ILP) bookshops in both 
London and Manchester. The Manchester police subsequently returned their 
copies, ilnding nothing officially objectionable in the work. The London 
authorities, however, took the case before a magistrate, and Brockway was 
convicted at Mansion House Police Court on 3 April. Against the advice of 
some (such as George Bernard Shaw, who thought it useless "to fight the 
government on its own ground in the Law Courts" ), Brockway decided to 
appeal, The appeal, which was heard on 28 June in the City of London Quarter 
rs Ibid, p, 19-36. 
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Sessions, failed. In addition to the destruction of the copies of the play seized 
by the London police, Brockway was assessed a fine of /100 or, in default of 
payment, imprisonment for 61 days — a typical punishment under normal 
procedure of law. » 
Brockway's case highlighted a number of issues involved with censorship; 
the subjective nature of the actions, the responsibilities of the writers themselves 
in writing the work, and the delicate issues involved in restricting civil liberties. 
Censorship was not the only means of restricting civil liberties under the Act, 
however, as other regulations were passed covering a variety of freedoms, The 
series of powers granted under Regulation 9 dealt with the right of assembly; 
9A gave authorities the power to prohibit meetings and processions, while eight 
additional amendments extended this power to a variety of functions. 
Regulation 13 gave authorities permission to require people to remain indoors 
as they saw fit, while 13A was used to prohibit prostitutes from living in or 
frequenting areas around military camps. The goal of the regulations issued 
under Regulation 14 also gave the state the power to control civilian movement; 
Regulation 14 granted the power to remove suspects from specified areas, while 
Regulations 14A, C, D, E, F, and G limited entry and exit both within and 
without the United Kingdom. 2O 
» H. C. Debs, 5th ser. , vol. LXXXIII (1915), col. 1182; Fenner Brockway, 
Towards Tomonow, p. 39. 
2s Pulling, DORA htanual, pp. 79-83, 92-6. 
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Of all the measures introduced under Regulation 14, 14B was by far the 
most signi6cant in its impact on Britain. It gave the power administratively to 
restrict or detain people suspected "of hostile origin or associations. " Hostile 
origin in this context referred to enemy aliens, and the Regulation 
complemented other laws available to the government, the most notable of 
which was the Ahens Restriction Act passed on 5 August 1914 which allowed 
the government to round up and detain aliens at the start of the war. But the 
association aspect of Regulation 14B allowed for the extension of the power to 
British subjects as well, something not previously available to the government. 
Furthermore, the entire process circumvented the courts, thus removing the 
safeguards in the traditional system. This is not to say that the process was 
completely arbitrary, however; there was a body of appeal in the form of an 
advisory committee established to deal with the cases of enemy aliens and dealt 
with 14B detainees as well. » 
Such authority to detain people was sought by the domestic security 
services primarily as a means of controlling the movement of suspected enemy 
sympathizers in the country. Many concerned with domestic security, primarily 
the recently established Secret Service Bureau, feared that the German 
government sought to create a network of agents from German nationals who 
Ibid, p. 93-4; J. C. Bird, Control of Enemy Civilians in Great Britain 
1914-1918 (New York: Garland Pub. , 1986), pp. 14, 95-7. 
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had taken up residence in Britain. 22 The creation of the regulation itself was 
made possible by the public anger felt towards Germans, anger fueled by the 
recent sinking of the liner Lusliania on 7 May. Sir John Simon defended the 
regulation in the House of Commons by making such an expansion of power 
seem like nothing more than a logical extension of alien control policy. He 
stated, ". . . it is reasonable that we should consider and deal with a certain 
number of cases where the individual is of hostile origin or hostile associations 
but it is technically not an alien. " He added, "I do not myself think that you 
ought to draw a strict line of legal division between persons who are naturalized 
and persons who are natural born citizens of this country, " as both were liable 
for their "hostile origin or associations. "23 
Despite the perceived urgency of the measure, by 2 March 1916 there 
were only sixty-aine people detained under Regulation 14B, fifteen of whom 
were British subjects. The numbers increased over the next eighteen months; 
seventy-four people taken into detention by February 1917 of whom fifteen 
were British, increasing to 125 by June 1917, with seventy five of them British. 
After that, however, the numbers began to fall to sixty-seven detainees by June 
22 S. T. Felstead, German Spies ar Bay (New York: Bretano's, 1920), 
23 H, C. Debs, 5th ser. , vol. LXXI (1915), col. 1842. 
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1918, eighteen of them British, ~ These were people suspected of espionage or 
sabotage, and most were beld at St, Mary's Institute, in Cornwallis Road, 
Islington-an old Poor Law institution converted to a holding center-under 
police guard. 
Though the actual numbers of people detained under Regulation 14B 
were small, the measure was still controversial enough to generate protest 
Much of the opposition to the regulation was catalyzed by specific cases, 
involving questionable decisions to detain. One example was the detention of 
Hilda Howsin, a sympathizer of the cause of Indian nationalism, who was 
rounded up for allegedly aiding a friend who was a German agent, while 
another involved the Hungarian portrait painter Philip de Lkszlo for sending 
money to his family via a Dutch diplomatic pouch. The most important case 
both publicly and legally, however, was the legal challenge R. v. Halliday ex parte 
Zadig, The argument advanced in the challenge of the detainee was "that the 
regulation was ultra vivres, that is to say outside the power of legislation 
delegated to the Privy Council by DORA. " The question underlying the 
argument was whether or not such basic changes in the British constitution 
could be altered by administrative decree or whether it took a more established 
approach of Parliamentary act. Though tbe House of Lords ultimately decided 
in the favor of the Crown in March 1917, the matter was sufficiently doubtful to 
Ibid, vol. LXXX (1916), cols. 1236-72; vol. XC (1917), col. 1845; vol. 
XCIV(1917), col. 1947; vol. CVI (1918), col. 1731. 
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warrant a suggestion for legislation retrospectively legalizing previous DORA 
regulation, » 
Though the Zadig case and other legal challenges to Regulation 14B 
failed, they served to spark critics in Parliament. One Liberal, W. W. Ashley, 
sought to register his protest in a vote on the Home Office on 2 March 1916. " 
He was joined later in the month by C, P. Trevelyan and F. W. Jowett, who 
moved "that the administration of the Defence of the Realm Acts has often 
been more rigorous than the nature or seriousness of the cases justifed and that 
. . . the imprisonment without trial of any class of British citizens at the 
discretion of the executive is dangerous to the liberty of the subject. 'u7 Such 
protests, however, were in the minority as the rest of Parliament continued to 
quietly acquiesce in the government's use of detention without trial. 
Parliament's general silence on the government's detention policies was 
not surprising given their overall acquiescence in efforts to curtail civil liberties 
in the name of waging war. As this chapter has shown, such efforts struck at 
some of the most fundamental freedoms available to British citizens; freedom of 
the press, of movement, and of the right to a trial. Much of this silence was 
due to two basic belieis that underlined attitudes taken towards the Act; that 
» A. W. Brian Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 24, 
~ H, C. Debs, vol. LXXX (1916), col. 1236. 
» Ibid, vol. LXXXI (1916), col. 414. 
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such steps were both necessary to win the war and that they were temporary 
and would be reversed at the end of the conflict. Temporary policy based on 
immediate necessity, however, left its mark upon the nation, and it is this 




The Armistice of November 11, 1918, brought an outpouring of relief 
and joy throughout Great Britain. For the millions who celebrated, the War 
was over; Britain and her allies had humbled the Central Powers, Yet in 
another sense, the War was not over. The Armistice was just that — a cease-fire, 
not an actual peace between the beligerents, The British state still operated 
under wartime conditions, a part of which was the continued use of the powers 
granted under the Defence of the Realm Act. For the next three years the 
state used the Act and its regulations as a tool of governance to deal with the 
immediate postwar world. This chapter will examine how DORA was utilized 
in post-war Britain, as well as examine its long term impact on the nation. 
Though the War was still technically in progress, the terms changed with 
the end of 6ghting. The public accepted the Armistice as if it were a formal 
peace, which limited their acceptance of broadened government authority. 
More important, though, was that the end of hostilities removed the sense of 
urgency and importance surrounding the war effort. Dealing with the 
outstanding conflicts in the Act and its accompanying resolutions became 
possible without the protective shield of the national emergency, Court cases 
regarding property requisitioning, unimpeded by the stalling of government 
counsel, began to move through the courts. The rulings on the De Keyser's 
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case in April 1919 overturned the use of the Royal Prerogative as justification 
for requisitioning, I while the ruling of the newcastle Breweries case in February 
1920 "threatened to undermine the compensation policy hitherto adopted, u and 
may have resulted in having the disbursement of almost f700 miHion in 
compensation. 3 
An interdepartmental committee formed to address the impending 
coHapse of the government's requisitioning policy offered two alternatives. The 
first was to pass an Indemnity BiH that would establish a legal (rather than ex 
gratia) basis for compensation and preclude further legal action. The second 
proposal the establishment of compensation as a legal right on tbe terms 
established by tbe Board of Arbitration for shipping; that is, based on revenues 
that the property would have earned had it not been requisitioned, with such 
amounts to be determined by the money earned by similar property that was 
not requisitioned. The government chose to draft an Indemnity Bill based on 
tbe second proposal, with an additional provision that claims for breach of 
contract (though not for compensation or damages) could be made by petition 
of right. 
Debate on the Indemnity Bill, which was introduced to Parliament in 
' See ch. II above. 
Rubin, Private Property, pp, 151, 192. 
3 H. C. Debs, 5th ser„vol. CXXVIII (1920), col. 1765. 
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May 1920, proved fierce. Opponents of the bill, such as Leslie Scott and Sir 
Edward Carson, argued that it would limit the amount that the most 
disadvantaged citizens could receive from the state. Proponents, on the other 
band, saw it as a measure to restrict the amount owed by the state and to put 
caps on the sums wealthy businessmen and would-be war profiteers would earn. 
The bill underwent modification in Parliament to address some of the concerns 
of its opponents. The informal Defense of the Realm Losses Commission was 
transformed into the War Compensation Court, a body with the statutory 
authority to assess compensation. Another amendment reaffirmed the De 
Keyser decision by ensuring the right to compensation even if no loss was 
suffered, as was tbe case with De Keyser's Hotel. The Indemnity Bill's passage 
into law thus saved the British state hundreds of millions of pounds while 
defining the rights of the people in relation to the state. 4 
By this time, however, the days of the Act were numbered, as its formal 
end came with the Termination of War Act of 1918. This established the terms 
of DORA's demise with the declaration of the legal end of the war by the 
Crown-in-Council, which came on 31 August, 1921. But while the Defense of 
the Realm Act thus passed from existence, it lived on in other forms. Britain 
found the need for some of the powers granted by DORA in dealing with other 
problems. This was first seen in the need to maintain DORA's powers of 
4 Rubin, Private Property, pp. 213-20. 
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industrial action. The end of fighting brought a wave of industrial unrest, and 
to handle this the authorities sought to use the tools of state power to which 
they were by then accustomed. The government sought a more suitable 
mechanism than the wartime statutes to deal with this problem, and created the 
Industrial Unrest Committee in February 1919 to find solutions to emergencies 
created by industrial action. Their solution was to draft the Strike (Exceptional 
Measures) Bill the next month. This legislation, which would have banned 
strikes by the Triple Alliance (of the National Mineworkers' Union, the 
National Union of Raihvaymen, and the Transport and General Workers 
Union) and legalized the confiscation of union funds, drew upon the Defence of 
the Realm Acts for their inspiration. The government thought the bill too 
extreme to pass through Parliament, and they shelved it for the next seven 
years. ' 
Britain faced far greater problems in Ireland, problems which required 
far greater powers than were available to combat the nascent civil war that 
threatened to tear the United Kingdom apart. The immediate roots of the 
conflict lay in the Easter Rebellion of 1916, when a group of Irish Volunteers 
rose up in Dublin in a feeble attempt to gain independence. The uprising 
lacked popular support and was put down by British officials before the week 
was out. Martial law was axiomatically declared on the Tuesday of the revolt, 
s Townshend, Making the Peace, p. 84. 
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though such a move was symbolic; the powers necessary to deal with the 
rebellion were contained in the Defense of the Realm Act. "[I]n fact, all the 
arrests, trials, internments, and executions carried out in 1916 were carried out 
under DORA, not martial law. a The government kept to a minimum DORA's 
subsequent use in the simmering civil conflict that followed in Ireland, 
preferring to use the older Criminal Law and Procedure Act of 1887 to deal 
with the growing unrest. 
When the Irish Republican Army began conducting ambushes and 
attacking police stations in the winter of 1919-20, however, it became apparent 
that something more was needed to deal with the unrest in Ireland. By this 
time, however, DORA's days were numbered. The Treaty of Versailles 
signalled the approaching end of the war, and with it the use of the Act. 
Something else was needed that was specifically tailored to the Irish "troubles. " 
The solution was the optimistically-named Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 
(ROIA). Passed in 1920, it was closely modeHed after DORA in its grant of 
powers to the authorities to deal with unrest. The ROIA foreshadowed the use 
of the Defence of the Realm Act as a template for subsequent legislation, an 
approach that the government would use again in drafting postwar legislation. 
This approach was applied again in enshrining the Defence of the Realm 
Act's emergency powers to handle civil disturbances in Britain itself with 
' Ibid, p, 70, 
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permanent legislation. This effort culminated in the Emergency Powers Act 
(EPA), which passed through Parliament in October 1920. The first drafts 
"bore an uncanny resemblance to DORA, '" and the final draft was thought to 
be so politically dangerous that the Lloyd George government waited until the 
industrial conflicts of that fail to introduce it. Such as strategy increased the 
likelihood of passage, for as two authors put it, the bill appeared "when 
Parliamentary and public opinion was least able dispassionately to weigh up 
either its short-term merits or long-term consequences. "' In the debate that 
followed, both Prime Minister David Lloyd George and the Conservative leader 
Andrew Bonar Law attempted to gain support by stressing the similarity of the 
EPA with the Defence of the Realm Act in an effort to assuage their 
opponents' fearsy Despite the outcry about the bill in both Parliament and the 
press, the EPA passed though the Commons on a vote of 238-58 after only a 
week of limited debate. 
Among its many provisions, the most ixnportant allowed for a one-month 
declaration of emergency when essential materials and services were threatened, 
empowered the state to provide such services when they were deprived, 
governance through regulations made outside the parliamentary process, and 
' Ibid, p. 86. 
' Keith Jeffrey and Peter Hennessy, States of Emergency: British 
Government and Strikebreaking since 1919 (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 53, 
' K C. Debs, 5th ser. , vol. CXXXIII (1920), col. 1451, 1399, 
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summary arrest and trials. In many respects this represents an evolution of the 
Defence of the Realm Acts into a lasting peacetime form, and as such testifies 
to how DORA permanently transformed both the powers of the state and the 
mindset under which state ofiicials operated. The EPA granted far less power 
than DORA did; the one month time limit and restriction to use in only the 
most dire of industrial emergencies acted as a check on the power of the state, 
Still, the powers proved more than adequate when it was used to deal with 
strikes in 1921 and 1924, and the General Strike of 1926. w 
But no piece of legislation owed more to the Defence of the Realm Acts 
than the spawn of the next world war that started in 1939. By the end of 1938 
Britain was preparing for war, and as German actions throughout August 
increasingly made such a development inevitable, the government of NeviUe 
Chamberlain took the steps it saw as necessary for the conflict. Parliament 
enacted over forty statutes preparing the legal groundwork for war, but none 
were as important as the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act that was passed on 
24 August 1939 over only six dissenting votes. Seen as "a rejuvenated and 
expanded DORA, "" it gave the state virtually the exact same powers as its 
predecessor, with modifications improving some of the defects of the original, 
more hastily prepared legislation. In this sense, more than any of the other 
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 172-5. 
» Ibid, p. 185. 
pieces of legislation, the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act was the true progeny 
of the Defence of the Realm Act introduced in August, 1914: a clear link in a 
chain that stretched between two wars and beyond. 
The demise in 1921 of the Defense of the Realm Acts occurred in a 
different nation than the one which had seen their creation, When the first Act 
was passed in the heady early days of the War, it was a hurriedly created 
temporary expedient that would be repealed as soon as the soldiers returned 
home for Christmas. Though part of a general trend towards increasing the 
powers of the state, nobody, Liberal or Conservative, would have been prepared 
to accept the extent that DORA expanded these powers under anything less 
than emergency conditions. Only the onrush of war permitted its rapid passage 
without so much as a murmur of protest. In this sense it was a creature of its 
times, and stands out as an aberration. 
Yet when the final Act was repealed, it took place in a nation grown 
accustomed to the extreme conditions of wartime. As with so many other 
things, what had been unthinkable before the War was accepted as 
commonplace in its aftermath. The state's increased powers and its enlarged 
role in Britain were tolerated and even expected, as people increasingly turned 
to the state for solutions to their problems. The state, in turn, found that it 
could not meet the tasks it now sought to fill without the powers granted under 
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the Defence of the Realm Acts, and sought to bring it back in one form or 
another for decades afterward, 
This was the greatest legacy left to the nation by the Defense of the 
Realm Acts. Though not the only legislation that broadened the state's powers 
during the war, it was the most important in terms of the broad scope of powers 
it granted with such economy of words. This importance gave it a public 
prominence as well, one that even had an image in political cartoons. Both 
during and after the war, the cartoonists in Punch drew "Dora, " a spinsterish 
woman always telling people what they could and could not do in the context of 
government regulation. Not only is the image indicative of the Acts' 
prominence, but it suggests the acceptance, albeit grudgingly, in the public 
mind of the new role the state assumed in regulating British life. 
The Acts themselves played only one part of this. Their acceptability lay 
in two conditions, the first being the sacrifices the public assumed in going to 
war, The use of the original bill in August 1914 showed that the public willingly 
accepted such powers as necessary for a limited war. As the Great War 
continued, the public's willingness to make sacrifices grew. During the War, the 
British people were asked to make such sacrifices as rationing and conscription, 
sacrifices that would have been unthinkable, even abhorrent, in the prewar 
world, In this context, what more was it to temporarily give up abstract 
principles and rights if it meant defeating the Hun and bringing the men back 
home safely? 
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The second part to the acceptability of the state's broadened role lay in 
the judiciousness of the various governments of the period in using their 
powers. The Defense of the Realm Acts granted vast powers, powers that the 
government used selectively. The Asquith government was restrained in its use 
of DORA's powers, at times too restrained for the needs of the War. By 1916 
there was a growing feeling, as evidenced by the increased calls from such 
groups as government members debug with agriculture and coal miners in 
Wales, that the state needed to play a more active role in order to see its goals 
accomplished. When David Lloyd George took office as Prime Minister in 
December, 1916, such groups had a leader more attuned to their suggestions. 
Yet even then, government intervention was carried out on a case-by- 
case basis. There was no wholesale, unilateral takeover of industry during the 
war, nor did the government assume any role that was not already being filled 
adequately by the private sector. Private property seizure was based on 
inunediate need and involved adequate compensation to the owner. The most 
prominent cases of state expansion during the War-in regulating agricultural 
production and nationalizing the coal mines-were based on the impending 
crises of insufficient food supplies and the danger of industrial unrest 
specifically, Furthermore, state intervenfion took place with many internal 
checks and balances, and great latitude was given to private interests within the 
sector in question. Even in dealing with civil liberties, state action was 
restrained in many instances by political considerations. Such actions were 
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hardly signs of a state corrupted by the powers available to it. 
The end result of this was the subsequent growth of the power of the 
British state and the development of British constitutional history in this 
direction. The Defence of the Realm Acts became the model of some of the 
most important legislation of the interwar period that expanded the power of 
the state, as well as the act that became the basis of the state's wartime 
authority. More importantly, it advanced the British people's acceptance of the 
new powers far beyond what it would have been. Without the war, such 
expansion would have resulted in numerous Parliamentary and legal challenges 
that might have delayed or even turned back this growth. The First World War 
allowed it to be done by 6at, with practically no protest or opposition, 
It must be noted as a caveat that the Defence of the Realm Acts did not 
start this trend. As was noted in Chapter One, the power of the state had been 
growing steadily since the nineteenth century. The war accelerated this trend 
out of all proportion to its peacetime development, The Defence of the Realm 
Acts-their introduction, continued existence, and legacy-were one part of this, 
both representative of and advancing the trend. Without the Defence of the 
Realm Acts, the increase in state power would have taken place; without the 
growth of the state prior to the war, the Defense of the Realm Acts might not 
have existed at all. 
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